This thesis asks why and how The European Union (EU) and The United States (US) differ in their responses to China’s subsidized exports and general trading practices. To answer the question, a comparative analysis of policies from 2018 to 2024 has been conducted.

The analysis is done through the lens of International political economy theories of neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and strategic trade theory. The primary sources that are used in this thesis are legal text and government and parliamentary official statement and hearings.

The findings suggest that there is common ground between EU and the US as they both identify China a systematic threat to the global free trade, but they diverge in their logics to respond to it. The EU follows the path of liberal institutional enforcement mainly through multilateral measures and limited safeguarding and anti-dumping duties, while the US pursues a realist path of balancing power mostly through unilateral tariffs, critical supply-chain measures and some bilateral deals. These findings shows that both actors respond to China and intervene in the global trade processes, but through different channels.

This research contributes to the understanding of patterns of behavior of these economic actors and can help scholars, policy makers, and businesses to make predictions when similar circumstances occur in the future.