Change search
Refine search result
1 - 4 of 4
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Rows per page
  • 5
  • 10
  • 20
  • 50
  • 100
  • 250
Sort
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
Select
The maximal number of hits you can export is 250. When you want to export more records please use the Create feeds function.
  • 1.
    Brülde, Bengt
    University West, Department of Nursing, Health and Culture, Division of Health and Culture.
    Art and science, facts and knowledge2007In: Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, ISSN 1071-6076, E-ISSN 1086-3303, Vol. 14, no 2, p. 111-127Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 2.
    Brülde, Bengt
    University West, Department of Nursing, Health and Culture, Division of Health and Culture.
    Mental Disorder and Values2007In: Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, ISSN 1071-6076, E-ISSN 1086-3303, Vol. 14, no 2, p. 93-102Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is now generally agreed that we have to rely on value judgments to distinguish mental disorders from other conditions, but it is not quite clear how. To clarify this, we need to know more than to what extent attributions of disorder are dependent on values. We also have to know (1) what kind of evaluations we have to rely on to identify the class of mental disorder; (2) whether attributions of disorder contain any implicit reference to some specific evaluative standard; and (3) whether the concept of mental disorder is value laden in the definitional or in the epistemic sense. I will argue that the evaluations we have to rely on are mainly considerations of harm, but that we also need to rely on other evaluations; that there should be no references to specific evaluative standards; and that even though mental disorders are necessarily undesirable, "mental disorder" may well be a descriptive phrase.

  • 3.
    Brülde, Bengt
    et al.
    University West, Department of Nursing, Health and Culture, Division of Health and Culture.
    Radovic, Filip
    Dysfunctions, disabilities and disordered minds: Our response to the commentaries2006In: Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, ISSN 1071-6076, E-ISSN 1086-3303, Vol. 13, no 2, p. 133-141Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 4.
    Brülde, Bengt
    et al.
    University West, Department of Nursing, Health and Culture, Division of Health and Culture.
    Radovic, Filip
    What is mental about mental disorder?2006In: Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, ISSN 1071-6076, E-ISSN 1086-3303, Vol. 13, no 2, p. 99-116Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The recent discussion of the concept of mental disorder has focused on what makes a mental disorder a disorder. A question that has received less attention is what makes a mental disorder mental rather than somatic. We examine three views on this issue—namely, the internal cause view, the symptom view, and the pluralist view—and assess to what extent these accounts are plausible. In connection with this, three strategies that have been used to pinpoint the mental in psychiatry are identified, namely negative characterizations (the mental as the nonsomatic), exemplification of paradigmatic mental features, and an appeal to intentional content. We also examine different versions of nihilism, the view that the distinction between mental and somatic disorder is ill founded. Finally, it is observed that the discussion of what makes a mental disorder mental has largely been unaffected by conceptions of the mental in the philosophy of mind.

1 - 4 of 4
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf