The objective of this thesis is to uncover how the historical Egyptian civil-military relations came to affect the military elite’s behavior and actions during the 1977 Bread Riots, the 2011 Rosetta Revolution, and the subsequent military intervention in 2013. In so doing, this paper illuminates how the military negatively contributed to the failed democratic transition of Egypt in 2013. This thesis utilizes a descriptive historical content analysis of a qualitative nature, with data collected from a diverse set of sources so as to curb investigator bias. It accounts for the time frame of 1970 to 2013 by analyzing the historical evolvement of Egyptian civil-military relations and highlights the impact such separated, integrated, or hybrid institutional patterns have had on each uprising, and the subsequent democratic transition by measuring levels of concordance/discordance. Although this thesis is a single case study, it is nonetheless comparative as it compares the differences and similarities in civil-military patterns during specific Egyptian presidential eras, starting from Sadat and ending with Morsi. This methodology is complemented with a mixed theoretical approach: historical institutionalism with its distinctive feature of path dependency and the theory of concordance. The results show that all three structural patterns of civil-military relations (integration, separation, and a hybrid form) were present depending on the era of presidency, and that these patterns accumulated vast material and institutional interests for the military establishment which it did not care to give up to civilian leaders. This thesis concludes that the CMR policies formulated during each presidency came to have a direct impact on the military’s behavior in its protection of the Sadat regime, as well as its intervention on both Mubarak and Morsi.