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The Dragon, The Unicorn and the Grip of The Lion

– A Comparative Case Study on the Secessionist Political Parties in Scotland & Wales and the Nationalist Arguments Aiming for Secession

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Abstract

This thesis is conducted as a descriptive comparative case study with the aim to explore the utilisation of different forms of nationalist arguments for secession by the Scottish National Party in the Scottish Parliament and Plaid Cymru in the Welsh Assembly. Based on the application of nationalist theories from three different modernist scholars, statements made by each party are analysed from politico-ideological, economic, and socio-cultural perspectives. The Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru share both secession as the ultimate goal and perceptions of being in a subjugated position within the United Kingdom. However, the results of the qualitative textual content analyses show that the approach towards secession is fundamentally varied between the two parties. The Scottish National Party utilises predominantly economic arguments for independence whilst Plaid Cymru find themselves arguing for further devolution of powers together with attempts to differentiate themselves from the UK. This study confirms a number of claims and ideas from previous research within the academic fields of nationalism and secessionism while simultaneously delivering findings on unexplored idiosyncrasies of nationalist discourses in Scotland and Wales. Subsequently, it is our aim to contribute to a deeper and more structured understanding regarding the content of nationalist arguments for secession.

Keywords: Nationalism, Secession, Scotland, Wales, the United Kingdom

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Secondly, we would like to mention, with regards to the title of this study, that the dragon symbolises Wales, that the unicorn symbolises Scotland, and that the lion symbolises England. England, which is so commonly seen as the embodiment of the UK government of Westminster.

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1. Introduction

Nationalism is a concept which continues to stir up emotions, even in this current age of globalisation. But how do we define nationalism? A definition that helps to make nationalism into a concrete concept has been provided by Ernest Gellner (2006:1), who proposes that nationalism is “primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent”. In this context, nationalism is a concept utilised with the aim to shape and defend the emergence of the nation-states, and consequently national identities, which began in the late 1700’s and continued well throughout the 1900’s (Held, cited in Pierson, 2011:32-33). But nationalism is also being utilised by groups who perceive themselves to be their own nation within the territories of the nation-states. The political expression of this phenomena is secessionist parties, utilising nationalist arguments in their aim to subvert the nation-state and, ultimately, establish a nation-state of their own. As such, they turn the nation-state’s method of consolidation against itself, in order to achieve their own sovereignty.

Political parties aiming for secession are nothing new to the political scene in the United Kingdom (UK), in fact, the two units of analysis for this study, the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru (PC) in Wales, have been around since 1934 and 1925 respectively. Their growing influence on Scottish and Welsh politics resulted in the first referendums on devolution of powers in 1979, where Scotland voted in favour of initiating this process of home rule, but where Wales, in the end, declined. Then, in 1997, the second referendum on devolution of powers was held, where Scotland voted to further the process and where Wales voted to take their first steps towards self-determination (Denver, 2002:828). But what constitutes the central question here, in light of the Scottish referendum on independence in 2014, is how these secessionist political parties in contemporary Scotland and Wales are utilising nationalist arguments to support their strive for secession from the UK. We find this to be of great interest because nationalist populism has recently seen a surge within the political landscapes of many places in the world, and not only in places where secession has been expressed as the goal. Additionally, it is our firm conviction that there is a perpetual need for nationalist discourses to be understood within the context of their own time if they are to be comprehensible in constantly changing settings and *milieus*, a conviction supported by Jonathan Haidt (2016:46).

A significant amount of research has been conducted on the phenomena of nationalism and secession, and the suggestions as for their emergence, their effects and their future are diversified to say the least (Fukuyama, 2018; Gellner, 2006; Renan, 1990; Smith, 1979; etc). Perhaps the most striking feature of these academic disciplines is the number of concepts, that are not only ambiguous and highly debated, but also intertwined to a point where one concept hardly can be intensively investigated without at least a basic understanding of the meanings of the other concepts and their significant role for each other's behaviour and existence. The academic debates on the concepts of the nation, the nation-state, nationalism, national identity and secessionism are therefore all presented in the coming chapter, aiming to give the reader an insight into this intellectual matrix. Furthermore, the next chapter is aiming for the reader to be presented with what we find to be absent from previous research, and consequently, the academic justification for this research project. The chapter following that, will introduce the theoretical approach and there the central themes and assumptions of the chosen theories, provided for by the modernist-nationalist scholars Ernest Gellner (2006), John Breuilly (1993) and Michael Hechter (1999), will be given in order to derive the operational definitions of the analytical framework. Moving from that, the specified aim and research questions will be presented, followed by the chapter where the light will be turned towards our rationale for; the choice of conducting this research project as a comparative case study, the choice of utilising statements made by the SNP in the Scottish Parliament and by PC in the Welsh Assembly as data for analysis, and the choice of performing two separate qualitative textual content analyses as the method for analysing the data. From there, the chapter for the analyses of the nationalist arguments made by the SNP and PC is put on display, where the analyses of the argumentations of each party are executed separately to be compared at the end of the chapter. Finally, the chapter for the conclusions will tie this study together and shed some light upon the thoughts and reflections which correspond to the findings of the analyses. Combined, the contents of these chapters are aiming to serve as the foundation for the possibility to answer the principal research question that is driving this study: How are different forms of nationalist arguments utilised by the secessionist political parties within the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly?

2. Literature Review

The concern of this study is that of different expressions of nationalism utilised by the SNP and PC in their aim for secession from the UK, and as such, to contribute to the academic literature on the field of nationalism. There is a vast amount of material out there, concerned with how aspiring secessionist actors turn to nationalist discourses in order to achieve their goals, but not much of it is concerned with how nationalist discourses are utilised by political secessionist parties within political assemblies. However, something that does become evident while delving into the academic debate on the field of nationalism, is that concepts such as the nation, nationalism, national identity and secessionism are highly contested and ambiguous, yet intertwined, concepts. Below, through a series of steps, the themes and thoughts of the academic fields related to this study will be presented and discussed in order to clarify the academically interpreted meanings and significances of the central concepts. The rationale of this chapter is that the actors within the secessionist political parties in Scotland and Wales see themselves as part of a separate nation, subjugated by the UK, from which their goal is to secede, and ultimately, to establish their own nation-state. To achieve this goal, they are utilising different types of nationalist arguments, aiming to emphasise their separate national identity over that of the superimposed British identity. Following this, we will explore what we deem to be absent from the debate, what we seek to contribute, and ultimately to present the motivations for our research question.

2.1 The Nation

In the academic discussion on what would be a broadly applicable definition of what constitutes a nation, Anthony D. Smith (1989:342), claims that the most commonly accepted definition of the modern concept of the nation is “a named community of history and culture, possessing a unified territory, economy, mass education system and common legal rights”. Adding to that, Ernest Renan (1990) contributes with the idea that the nation, in the contemporary understanding of the concept, is a rather recent materialisation in history. By this he is specifically referring to the fusion of a nation's component populations. The empires of the ancient world, the city states, and the various confederations of republics could not be regarded as nations in this context. Despite examples of culturally varied diaspora, or what can be viewed as component populations congregating within cities and nations, Renan suggests that the essence of a nation consists of its soul as a spiritual principle. This spiritual principle is the product of the dynamic relationship between two elements, namely; the past

and the present, and very much like the spirit of the individual, the spirit of the nation is the climax of a far-ranging past of endeavours, sacrifice and devotion. The present, then, is constituted on a shared compliance of living together, aiming for a future of shared endeavours, sacrifices and devotion. That a definition of the nation quite easily turns into an abstract concept is further demonstrated by one of its definitions, famously contributed by Benedict Anderson (2006:4-7). Anderson defines the nation as a limited and sovereign political community of the imagination. His logic, however, is somewhat more graspable, and is such that the nation, firstly, is imagined due to the fact that the vast majority of people living within the perceived nation will never know the other members, but still a shared communion exists within the minds of each and every one of them. Secondly, it is “imagined as limited” because there are other perceived nations which exists beyond its borders. Thirdly, it is “imagined as sovereign” in the sense that its origin stems from the evaporated legitimacy of the dynastic realms, caused by the revolutionary ideas of the enlightenment, and fourthly, that “it is imagined as a community” to the extent that even in the face of exploitations and inequalities, the nation remains a “deep and horizontal comradeship”, which so commonly is accompanied by nationalism.

2.2 The Nation-State

Nationalism, as it is contemplated by John Breuilly (1993:1), is a form of political behaviour which should most prudently be understood within the context of the modern nation-state and the emergence of the system that it wields. Breuilly’s rationale stems from the idea that nationalism is first and foremost a matter of politics, and the main concern of politics is that of power. Power, then, in the setting of our time, is before anything else the position of being in control of the state. Such a viewpoint is elaborated further by Ernest Gellner (2006:4) who proposes that nationalist ideology only reveals itself in *milieus* where the nation-state is well established, and its existence is popularly regarded as a given. Gellner further elaborates that the very being of “politically centralised units”, that is the state, and of “a moral-political climate”, where the nation-state’s position is presupposed and assumed to be the norm, is a needed circumstance for the emergence of nationalism. Moreover, Charles Tilly (2002:165) also emphasises the centralised control wielded by the nation-state as a necessary condition for the rise of nationalism. Launched initially through the enormous expansion of the national military, accompanied by massive state budgets, which was then extended to areas such as production and political activity, the nation-states then centralised the control of the key-institutions within the national territory, including national education systems, aiming to

enforce standardised national languages and national communications networks, inventing national flags, symbols, anthems, holidays and traditions in order to consolidate their positions.

2.3 Nationalism

It is recognised by several scholars (Lawrence, 2005; Piper, 2004; Özkirimli, 2017) that there are three schools of thought which recur frequently in the academic debate on nationalism, namely; the primordialist, the ethno-symbolist and the modernist. Laurence Piper (2004:124-125) identifies the essence of the primordialist take on nationalism as the idea of the nation as a natural and persistent central element throughout the history of human society, with a clear cultural character. Nations are perceived to have existed since time immemorial and will continue to do so in perpetuity. Their stories are characterised by antiquity, some era of glory, a superior culture, a dormant aeon, and also a hero, who awakens the nation from its dormant condition.

The ethno-symbolist position, with regards to the previously mentioned schools of thought, is positioned at the in-between of the two others (Piper, 2004:132-137; Özkirimli, 2017:154-155). Here, the concept of nationalism is believed to be a consequence of modernity whereas nations as a concept, to a very large extent, are perceived to be a phenomenon which is socially and culturally constructed on the basis of a “pre-modern ethnic legacy”. Hence, culture is a concept which is held in high regard among the ethno-symbolists and it is cultural nation-building that is the catalyst for nationalism, including nationalist art and literature, national languages, national festivals, etc. It follows, therefore, according to this line of thought, that culture is the key feature in the construction of national identities, and the effects which that culture has on national identity ultimately affects the expressions of political nationalism.

As much as is presented in the previous section, albeit not fully, there is a school of thought within the academic debate on nationalism which stresses the emergence of the nation-state in the modern era of human history. The scholars within this school of thought are commonly labelled as modernists (Özkirimli, 2017:81). However, the focal point of the modernists is not necessarily the nation-state as such, but rather the modernity of the nation-state as an institution. Also, the coming of the industrial age was of great concern to the modernists because according to them, it was industrial and bourgeois capitalism, in a synergetic relationship with the nation-state, that established the ‘modern-age’, and which ultimately

forged the cultural, the economic and the political structures which are needed to allow for nationalists to imagine the nation (Anderson, 2006; Lawrence, 2005:12).

2.4 National Identity

On the topic of national identity, the renowned scholar, Homi K. Bhabha (1994:201), is admitting that the most accepted reason historically for the existence of national identity is the perception of a “holistic cultural entity”. But Bhabha claims that such a perception is merely a consequence of the uncertainty of the idea of the nation as a strategy for telling the story which explains the supposed experiences that comprise the national identity, that is the narrative. Similarly, Liron Lavi (2013), distinctly drawing inspiration from the constructivist viewpoint on national identity held up by scholars such as Bhabha, and more specifically through Bhabha’s ‘dual temporality of the nation’ in combination with Kattis Honkanen’s ‘dual temporality of performance’, argues that nationality as a category of identity, is something which is constructed under temporal conditions. Through long-lasting repetitive performances and practises, which work in a symbiotic relationship with an adjusted chronological order that is suited for the sole purpose of justifying the performed repetition, this symbiosis then gives credibility to the national narrative. Lavi further implies that the temporality of such performance’s stems from their lack of origin, which therefore gives them a mimetic temporal nature. As such, should the repetitive performances, due to their temporal nature, somehow deviate from the national historical narrative, then that will expose the elastic boundaries of the national identity as well as its dynamic disposition. As a consequence, each repetition always brings with it the prospect that the national identity might be modified.

In contrast to the somewhat abstract definitions of what comprises the national identity expressed by Bhabha and Lavi, David McCrone (1997:580) contributes with more structural explanations, although he aligns with them regarding the idea that national identity is something which is constructed by those who are participating within it. McCrone suggests, in relation to the development of the modern nation-state, that national identities initially sprang out of the citizenry’s desire to belong to the national community, from where they were able to acquire social, cultural and psychological gains. However, this was not just a one-way street, because in order to enjoy the gains of the national community, the citizenry had to obey the set of rules which the leaders of the nation-state imposed upon it, and they utilised the concept of national identity rather cunningly to encourage obedience. Considered from a microanalytical perspective, Bhikhu Parekh (2000), highlights the term identity primarily as

related to the individual, whereas nations are extended entities which encompass the collective. Identity, on the individual level, comprises of many traits and characteristics and these vary in importance to determine our sense of self. Local club membership, for example, is not regarded as affecting our sense of self as highly as religion, gender or values will do. Furthermore, Parekh stipulates national identity as a term that is fairly modern in its origin, presumed to have originated in the 1950's where it replaced, among others, 'the national character' and 'the national soul'. As a concept, according to Parekh, national identity is hard to define as a fixed set of principles or values, rather it can be described as the identity of a political community that, among other characteristics, shares a set of central values on how it conducts its affairs and its organising principles.

On the note of central values, then, Francis Fukuyama (2018) contributes to the debate on national identity by discussing it from the inclusive *vis-a-vis* the exclusive perspective. Fukuyama claims that several of the contemporary political issues, stretching from failing economies, ethnic suppression and civil warfare, to populism and identity politics, all can be traced back to a perceived lack of public recognition at the individual level, and as such, these political issues are a consequence of exclusive expressions of national identity. He moves on, then, to list the benefits of fostering an inclusive sense of national identity, highlighting benefits such as "physical safety", "quality of government", "facilitating of economic development", "promotion of trust", "strong social safety nets", and the very being of a "liberal democracy" itself. Such benefits, according to Fukuyama, will assist the progress towards acknowledgement of dignity, and ultimately, strengthen any given society at its foundation.

2.4.1 British Identity

The discussion on what constitutes the British national identity requires some extra reflection due to the fact that the UK never was a nation, but instead, a state of nations, consisting of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales (Crick cited in McCrone, 1997:587). There is, however, some consensus regarding the key aspects which initially forged it. David McCrone (1997:584) and Robert Colls (2011:580), both with reference to the famous book *Britons* by Linda Colley, claim that modern British national identity has its roots in popular Protestantism, warfare with France, pride over the richness and vastness of empire, and prominence with regard to industrialisation. What is more, both of them share the idea that the key concept of keeping the British national identity alive since the birth of the Union in 1707, has been that the sense of Britishness has never really weighed heavily on the shoulders of the

majority of the citizenry's diverse senses of feeling Scottish, Welsh or English (Colls, 2011:582; McColl, 1997:584-585). Taking that argument further, Nathalie Duclos (2016:91), claims that there is a 'dual' sense to Britishness, meaning that a considerable part of the population living in the UK, to varying degrees, regard themselves as having at a minimum two national identities; a British, and a Scottish, Welsh or English. Colls then extends further on the concept of Britishness, taking it closer to the contemporary outlook than that which he and McColl drew from Linda Colley. He advances to the smaller, local stories, of Britain in the mid-decades of the 1900's. By referring to hallmarks of Britishness, ranging from the local pubs to the narrow channel-boats, from the 'Brick Lanes' to Blackpool Beach, from the parish church to the FA-cup final, Colls convincingly manages to establish that British national identity was alive and well throughout the UK even after the fall of the empire.

Continuing further up the historical timeline, and thus taking the concept of Britishness into the 21st century, Parekh (2000), sets the idea of the national identity as the identity of a political community within a British context. He concludes that the two main political entities which were aiming to define the British national identity at the turn of the century, the "New Right" & "New Labour", were seriously flawed in their lack of historical understanding with regards to their perception of Britishness. The former, Parekh claims, gave it far too much significance, while the latter appeared to ignore its reality completely. The remedy for this utter lack of historical comprehension would be a middle way, guided by characteristics such as inclusiveness, tolerance, cultural plurality and open-mindedness, which should all be inspirational, grounded in history, and democratically established. He stipulates further, that should this be accomplished, then this could work as a powerful tool for a positive development of Britishness. In hindsight, however, with Scotland having a referendum on independence (although the outcome favoured the Union) and the UK voting to leave the European Union (EU) very much due to immigration issues (Dennison & Geddes, 2018:1150), we can without difficulty say that Parekh's vision of inclusiveness, tolerance, cultural plurality and open-mindedness remains to be fulfilled.

2.4.2 Welsh Identity

As has previously been touched upon, many citizens within the UK live with a sense of dual identity (Duclos, 2016:91). The fact that Wales has been in union with England since the year 1282, which is the oldest union within Britain, and the English annexation of Wales in 1536, ultimately holds that any sense of Welshness, possibly even to a larger extent than any of the other national identities within the UK, needs to be contemplated against feeling British

(Davies, 1968:323; Stead, 1972:395). Many scholars who have studied Welsh identity (Davies, 1968; Stead, 1972; Studlar & McAllister, 1988:51; Thomas, 1997) do agree that the key instrument in the Welsh identity is the language. Peter Stead (1972:394-395) asserts that the concern for all the values within Welsh culture is expressed through the concern for the Welsh language, and that the aim for total equality with regards to the English language is of greater importance than political independence. Indeed, Hudson Davies (1968:324), reasoning by the same logic, highlights the significance of language within the Welsh identity with a claim that “many Welshmen have expressed surprise and disbelief that a serious nationalist movement could exist in Scotland where there was no living language to preserve”. According to Richard Haesley (2005:255-257), however, the language *per se* is not the prime concern of the Welsh Identity, but rather, it is anti-English sentiments which hold primacy. Yet the emotional bond that the Welsh experience with regards to their language, their culture, their history and so forth, holds a strong position indeed in their national identity. In fact, it runs deep to the extent where Haesley claims that this emotional bond exceeds any expressions of Welsh patriotism. Based on this claim, it is further argued by Haesley that the Welsh are taking the imaginative part of Benedict Anderson’s (2006) concept of the imagination of community up to a level where it is about to crack. This emotional bond, then, leads to a situation where the Welsh, although feeling sure that they are Welsh, do not have an exact common concept of what Wales is or who it is that is Welsh. Hence, it follows that the central features of the Welsh identity consist firstly, of repulsive sentiments towards the idea of being taken for Englishmen, secondly, of a pride over their language and their national culture, and thirdly, of an openness towards accepting other ‘territorial identities’, such as for example a British or a European, to be compatible with a Welsh identity.

2.4.3 Scottish Identity

In contrast to the Welsh, the current Scottish union with England did not come into effect until 1707. Duclos (2016:86) makes the reflection that while this union meant the end to the then Scottish Parliament, the Scottish were still permitted to hold on to their national identity as the terms of the union made it possible for them to operate as a separate society. More specifically, it was so because Scotland was permitted to keep some essential social and institutional markers of identity construction, such as an autonomous education-system at all levels, a separate judicial system and the Church of Scotland. Building his reasoning on that very same foundation of social and institutional markers of identity construction, John M MacKenzie (2008:1248-1249), argues further that the establishment of the Scottish Office and

a Secretary of State for Scotland in the 1880's, along with the period of national self-recognition in the 1930's, lasting up until current times, regarding the part Scotland had played in the construction of the British Empire, have all added to the sense of national identity which constitutes Scottishness today. Also, the idea that Scotland forged the modern world through the teachings of the Scottish enlightenment, most prominently by their native son Adam Smith and his theory on free market economies, is said to have a major impact on modern Scottishness. But according to Murray S Leith (2012), there exists a rift in contemporary Scotland in the matter of national identity. This rift exists due to a situation where the political elite, including the SNP, holds an inclusive sense of Scottishness, meaning that anyone who wants to feel Scottish has the freedom to do so, whereas the larger citizenry holds a more exclusive ideal, where Scottishness is something which can only be achieved through cultural adaptations. This claim seems to fit rather well with Haesley's (2005:253-257) take on the centralities of contemporary Scottish identity, which similarly to the Welsh identity, is primarily concerned with not being taken for Englishmen. The Scottish, then, have strong sentiments of pride with regards to the regional diversity of their national culture and the affluent Scottish history, even more so than the Welsh, yet the Scottish concern for their language is pretty much non-existent regardless of their Gaelic heritage. The Scottish also demonstrate, according to Haesley, an acceptance towards engaging in other 'territorial identities', however to a much lower extent than the Welsh, and with a clear preference towards a European identity over a British one.

2.5 Secessionism

Anything which calls for an explanation deserves to be properly defined. A very clear-cut definition of secessionism is provided for by Aleksandar Pavkovic and Peter Radan (2007:5); "the creation of a new state by the withdrawal of a territory and its population where that territory was previously part of an existing state". Such a definition might seem obvious to a student of politics since secessionist movements are striving for independence in a variety of places, such as Catalonia, Quebec, Scotland and Wales, just to mention a handful of the different cases (Breuilly, 1993:331-335). The debate between scholars on this topic has its focal point on the justifications for secession (Baer, 2000; Glaser, 2003; Miller, 1997; Wilkins, 2000), be they explanatory, normative or judicial. From a normative standpoint, Darryl J Glaser (2003:371-372) maintains, on the basis of freedom of association, that secession should be a possible option, democratically, for those who do seek it. Such a right, however, has to be relative given the quite likely possibility that there might exist other

democratic factors, such as freedom of speech or universal voting rights. David Miller (1997:271-272), following the normative justifications, switches the attention to the concept of self-determination and utilises a “principle of nationality” as the arguable, yet relative, claim for secession. There are two criteria needing to be fulfilled which Miller stresses in this principle. Firstly, the population of the intended secessionist unit ought to constitute a nation with a distinct separate identity with regards to the identity of the nation from which they aim to secede. However, a second criteria needs to be met in order to solidify the authenticity of their claim for secession, which is that they ought to demonstrate their ability to wield authority over the intended seceding territory.

On an explanatory note, Michael Hechter (1992) lays out a theory on secession with a foundation in rational choice. Hechter acknowledges that any association aiming for secession must share a common territory and a common language based on a common culture, but in addition to this it is also a prerequisite that they have shared interests, either with regards to production or to consumption. Shared interests, however, need not be the primary force, but rather, it is the economic individual aim for improved materialised living conditions, exemplified by Hechter as jobs, most likely provided within the newly established state-system, which explains secessionist activity. While Hechter provides an economic explanation, Smith (1979) provides a cultural one, rooted in ‘ethnic community’. Smith claims that the explanation for secessionism is culturally based, on the perception of a distinct ethnic community which legitimately demands sovereignty due to internal and historical laws. A politico-ideological explanation, then, is offered by John R Wood (cited in Pakovic & Radan, 2007:177-178). Wood suggests that secessionist movements, to the greatest extent and for all practical purposes, are driven by a nationalist ideology. The two-folded explanation behind a nationalist approach to secessionism is, according to Wood, to de-legitimise the rule of the current nation-state and then to define the reasons for its illegitimacy. In line with Wood’s suggestion that nationalist ideology is driving secessionist movements, Emmanuel Dalle Mulle & Ivan Serrano (2018), by analysing independence manifestos by the SNP in Scotland and the *Junts pel Sí* (United for Yes) coalition in Catalonia, concludes that both these secessionist movements clearly are driven by a nationalist ideology. In other literature concerned with secessionist movements, Montserrat Guibernau (2006), suggests that implementing a process of devolution of powers has been a successful strategy to strengthen regional identity without causing further damage to the national identity. She argues further that regional devolution of powers within liberal democracies such as the UK, Spain and

Canada, are tokens of trust given by the centralised government, and should curb any claims for secession. Considering the events taking place in Scotland and Spain since Guibernau's paper was published, we would argue that her argumentation was miscalculated.

2.6 Contribution

What we seek to contribute to the academic field of nationalism is an increased understanding regarding how secessionist political parties within the UK utilise nationalist arguments in debates within the political establishment. More specifically we aim to explore how nationalist arguments are utilised by the secessionist political parties in Scotland and Wales, the SNP and PC, within the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. In as much as has been presented above, there are plenty of intertwined concepts and themes which we deemed necessary to discuss on their own terms in order to achieve somewhat of a grasp of the driving forces for secessionist movements, such as the nation, the nation-state, nationalism and national identity, and as has been demonstrated in this chapter, a lot of work and research has been conducted to understand them. The same can unquestionably be said with regards to our selection for the units of analyses. The research conducted into the idiosyncrasies of the secessionist movements in Scotland and Wales, and the diverse reasons which explain them, is certainly vast and divergent (Haesley, 2005; Hechter, 1999; MacKenzie, 2008; Studlar & McAllister, 1988; Tilley & Heath, 2007; etc). Yet we are still to discover any comparative case studies on the secessionist political parties in Scotland and Wales with an interpretivist methodology, analysing political statements made within the respective political assemblies of each nation with the aim to differentiate the forms of nationalist arguments in favour of secession. We deem the lack of inquiries into nationalist argumentation and secessionist activity within the political assemblies of Scotland and Wales during the time period in proximity to the Scottish referendum on independence as specifically interesting for the purpose of this study due to their positions as the highest political instances in terms of meaningful discussions on secession from the UK. Now, regardless of our limited expectations considering the greater academic significance of this study, it is nonetheless our intention to contribute with something meaningful to the field of political science. Our chosen model is such that parts of it could easily be substituted so that other studies can be performed with a different approach, and as such, knowledge can be accumulated with regard to the research question: How are different forms of nationalist arguments utilised by the secessionist political parties within the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly?

3. Modernist Nationalism

This chapter will serve to give reason for our theoretical approach and to highlight why such an approach is of relevance to the phenomena of secessionism. It is our aim to present support for the idea that the theories of the modernist-nationalist scholars and their focus on the structural ramifications that the modern nation-state imposed on politics, economics and culture are well suited to demonstrate the nationalist nature of secessionist politics.

Consequently, we argue that the secessionist political parties in the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly are prudent cases of analyses for the investigation into the relevance of the modernist-nationalist theories in contemporary secessionist debates.

The modernist approach to nationalism is broadly held as the development of an antithesis to the long-held primordial beliefs of viewing nationalism and nations as consequences of the natural world. Whilst there are a great many ideas and views that are disputed between the prominent scholars of the modernist approach, they are firmly united in the idea that nationalism and nations emerged in the last two centuries. The emergence of nationalism and nations came about due to the structural development of the modern bureaucratic nation-state, along with other contemporary mechanisms such as urbanization, rational secularism, and industrial & bourgeois capitalism. The modernist scholars are to a large extent studying nationalism in the context of the nation-state and secessionism is occurring within that very same context. In fact, the secessionists are utilising the nation-state's own tool for consolidation against them, which we deem to be an interesting dynamic to say the least. Thus, modernist nationalism appears to provide a prudent theoretical approach to the phenomena of secessionism, and ultimately, that is the reason why we have made the choice to use modernist nationalism as the central school of thought for this study. However, a section on John Wood's theory on the secessionist prerequisites will follow the sections on the modernist-nationalist theories, aiming to clarify the connections between modernist nationalism and the phenomena of secession. The modernist-nationalist scholars are commonly divided into three sub-categories.

These categories, then, are labelled as economic, politico-ideological, and socio-cultural transformations. Further, it is generally held, that the similarities between the prominent modernist scholars are few and the differences are many. As such, they do not restrain their reasoning to any one sub-category but can be found arguing on most fronts. Therefore, the thinkers within the modernist-nationalist school of thought are conventionally separated into

the three sub-categories, depending on where they are channelling their focus (Lawrence, 2005:163-180; Piper, 2004:128-132; Özkirimli, 2017:81-153). When we derived the operational definitions that we are using in our analytical framework, we abided by this model of division. Consequently, we are using and applying theory from scholars within each sub-category to provide the very essence of what constitutes the components utilised in the analytical framework, which enabled us to distinguish between the different kinds of nationalist arguments that were extracted from the applied theories, and ultimately, to approach political statements which imply the benefits of seceding or the hazards of not doing so, with the derived components of nationalist arguments. John Breuilly's work in *Nationalism and the State* (1993), provides the politico-ideological theory, Michael Hechter represents the economic theory through his work in *Internal Colonialism* (1999), and Ernest Gellner's work in *Nations and Nationalism* (2006), stands for the socio-cultural theory.

3.1 Breuilly's Theory - The Politico-Ideological

Breuilly's book, *Nationalism and the State* (1993), is constructed, not only as a contribution to the field of nationalism, but also as a strategy for the study of nationalism. The politico-ideological section of the analytical framework will be derived from the typology created by Breuilly and the main assertions of his book. Breuilly (1993:1) affirms that whilst there are various ways to study and attempt to attain a deeper understanding of nationalism, such as through culture, ideology, identity and class, the proper way to look at the matter is by accepting that "nationalism is, above and beyond all else, about politics and that politics is about power". Nationalism is defined as the political movements seeking to attain and to wield state power with the justification of nationalist arguments. In turn, what constitutes a nationalist argument, is built upon three supporting assertions. Firstly, it is said that "there exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character", secondly, that "the interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values", and thirdly, that "the nation must be as independent as possible, this usually requires the attainment of political sovereignty" (1993:2). Breuilly's definition of nationalism and assertions which constitute a nationalist argument are the foundation for the politico-ideological category of nationalist arguments. Following Breuilly's typology, apart from the pursuit and acquisition of power, we have derived four components to be able to unearth more nuanced nationalist arguments; mobilisation, class, ideologic and symbolic. Whilst the sub-categories can be utilized individually, they are not separate, but rather entwined into the pursuit for power.

Mobilisation is based upon the premise that nationalist movements engage in mass politics. That is, they will affirm that they represent and speak for the nation. Nationalism is frequently faced with managing and obtaining support from sizable groups, often for a particular political goal. The need for mass support can arise due to economic or political changes as well as some form of crisis, the classic example of which is war. Contemporary examples of said changes can be as simple as the raising of taxes or challenges to locally established practices. What is shared among these various forms of changes is that they challenge the established political authority for the advancement of new elites. Often, a key component of nationalist movements is found in the local communes and towns. Apart from being a key component of the nationalist movements, these local communes can be a source for political changes that fuel nationalist sentiment as well as promoting rival nationalist movements. An example of such a local political change is immigration, where the arrival of immigrants can cause a strain on local power dynamics, which in turn creates tensions between the new arrivals and the host population (1993:19-25).

As is previously stated, most commonly, nationalist movements are made of new elites challenging the established political elites. However, there are many historical examples where this has not been the case, and Breuilly has divided these into different classes. Some of these classes, namely; the nobility, the peasants, and what Breuilly refers to as "traditional states", are not typical of the contemporary UK and will therefore not be explored further. The remainder do, however, warrant a mention as they pose albeit not complete, but in the very least, more relevancy. The first example is that of the traditional religious authority. Whereas Scotland and Wales are not mentioned as exceptions to the general rule of new elites challenging the establishment, Scotland do host some religious tension between catholic and protestant communities. Businessmen, craftsmen, manufacturers and the working class are groups who, again, are not subject as an exemption in the case of the contemporary UK. They all have economic interests that can be threatened due to various changes and businessmen especially have the potential to fund nationalist movements. The professionals and intellectuals are groups which are normally believed to be defenders of the establishment and government workers in particular, tend to view themselves as guarding the public interest. Noteworthy of these two groups is that many cases of nationalist movement leaders originated from them (1993:25-51).

Breuilly (1993:54) writes that "the core of a political ideology is its commitment to some ideal and the actions prescribed in order to achieve that ideal", and he further describes

ideology as having been formed out of a need within society to solve some dilemma and/or other intricate issues. The solutions to these rather intricate dilemmas can, by intellectuals, be transformed into simpler versions. These simpler versions can in turn, be used by other members of society as ideology. Central within nationalist ideology, is the idea that the natural must be defended from the unnatural, which in turn is how nationalist ideology will justify the 'natural' no matter how erratic the subject matter deemed natural might be. Nationalists will often look to some sort of essence from the past, some form of core to aspire to that can legitimise the path towards the national destiny. Breuilly depicts three notions that, whilst incongruous together, still can function as powerful tools for nationalist arguments. The first is the notion of a unique national community fallen into a severe case of disrepair but with the ability to be restored, and the second notion is that the nation as a society should possess its own state. In this regard the distinction between the nation and the society is at odds with the historicist view of society. The third notion is an irrational link between the cultural and political concepts of the nation, irrational mainly because making such a link is impossible. What nationalist ideology commonly does, is use the concept of the nation in various and often conflicting ways in order to justify their arguments (1993:54-63).

As opposed to religious or socialist ideology that generally celebrates a utopian existence, nationalist ceremonials and symbolism is distinct in that it celebrates itself. More often than not, what is perceived as glorious moments in history, preferably times of heroic defiance to foreign invaders, is made paramount within nationalist symbolism. The symbolism is then utilised, not only as a basis for a national identity connecting the heroes of the past to the people of the present through shared language and ancestry, but as well as a beacon towards the greatness that is yet to be achieved. In many ways nationalist symbolism is closely entwined with nationalist ideology, where the symbolism is used to enhance the ideology. What both aim to do, is to create a sense of uniqueness to morph society and state together, in effect, creating the nation-state. However, the historical events, the shared language, the values, morals and practices found within the nation are not invented by the nationalist movements. But among these components, the most powerful ones in terms of promoting the nationalist narrative are selected, whereas the less appealing components are disregarded. The end product is then made into the foundation used to justify the political goals (1993:64-70).

In as much as has been discussed here, we have derived five politico-ideological components of nationalist arguments which constitute a part of the theoretical framework, and which have served as indicators in our search for politico-ideological nationalist arguments, made by the

SNP and PC, in their strive for secession. They are; Power, Mobilisation, Class, Ideological, and Symbolic.

3.2 Hechter's Theory - The Economic

Is nationalism the political response to persistent economic regional inequalities? Hechter's theory (1999) on the matter suggests that at least with regards to Celtic nationalism within the British Isles, this may very well be the case. The question which consequently arises thus becomes how persistent economic regional inequalities are established? Hechter launches his theory on the idea that the birth of most modern states was the merger of groups with distinct cultural traits. As these states matured, their centralised governments were established in regions characterised by their administrative efficiency, ultimately making it the core region within the state borders, which to varying degrees distinguished itself with regards to the outer regions, that is the peripheral regions, in terms of cultural traditions such as language, religion, modes of production, and styles of life. As the core region is the political centre of the society, it necessarily follows that it advances, economically and technologically, compared to the peripheral regions, and as such, the political influence and control which it wields, effectively makes it the dominant region; politically, economically and culturally. To develop his theory, Hechter works with the social change model of internal colonialism as a contrast to the diffusion model of social change, which holds that the political, economic and cultural inequalities between core and peripheral regions, in the process of industrial modernisation, will ultimately cease to exist and become a whole, homogenous, society. On the other hand, the model of internal colonialism, similarly to the model of exogenous colonialism, holds that the continuing *modus operandi* of the core region is to dominate the peripheral regions politically, to discriminate them culturally, and to exploit them economically, effectively creating a cultural division of labour (1999:4-9).

The economic exploitation of the peripheral regions takes several expressions, primarily however, the peripheral economy is manipulated to function as an agent of complementary development to that of the core, and hence, credit, commerce and trade are controlled through judicial, political, and military efforts in order to consolidate the economic dependence upon the core. Furthermore, the peripheral economy is narrow compared to the core economy, in the sense that specialisation is limited to very few sectors and production is organised for export, making it sensitive indeed to fluctuating prices in the world market, and to political decisions made in the core region. The economic dependency serves, then, as a justified explanation for cultural discrimination, especially so if the peripheral region distinctly

diverges from the cultural traits of the core, denying members of the peripheral culture access to any high-status occupations through policy implementation. This is crucial to Hechter's theory because the institutionalised fusion of economic and cultural strata within society makes up for what Hechter refers to as the cultural division of labour, which becomes the key factor in determining the national identities, both for the core and the periphery. As such, the fundamental issue regarding the development of society is constituted on the matter of the allocation of resources, which industrialisation distributes in such an unequal manner, and which the dominant core region constantly aims to use to their advantage as they strive to further advance their superiority (1999:32-41). The colonial relationship is to a very large extent defined by the interaction of the minimum of two cultures, the conquering/annexing culture of the core and native culture(s) of the periphery. With the goal to impair the peripheral culture's resentment towards the colonial rule, the core culture is declared by its authorities to be supreme in terms of salvation and modernisation, and it is certainly important, with regards to social control, to subjugate the peripheral culture in order to facilitate this, because it constitutes a grave peril indeed for the core's domination, should the peripheral culture resurrect itself and realise its full potential (1999:73).

Political incorporation, as a general rule, is the preferred fashion by which the core region strongarms the peripheral economy into a complementary role, while simultaneously prohibiting any competition *vis-a-vis* the core, and the core may achieve this through different methods. As an example, interregional trade may be encouraged by political incorporation aiming to enlarge the sphere of the core region's market forces into the peripheral economy. The effect this will have on the peripheral economy is that it directly compels it into a change towards highly specialised export commodities. Continuingly, the core region may also develop heightened dominance with regards to trade, commerce and credit available for investment. As such, the core region can utilise political incorporation indirectly to cultivate economic dependence in the peripheral region through an increase in production intended for exchange. Also, political incorporation may literally be responsible for peripheral economic dependency by ruling out any political opposition towards core domination in terms of implementing protectionist measures (1999:81).

Building his argument further on the consequences of economic dependency through political incorporation, Hechter stresses the lack of sovereignty. The issue being addressed is that the state's burden to supply welfare is a fact which still exists today, and that the significant role the state can play with regards to economic development certainly is conspicuous. With the

legitimate threat of state sanctioned armed violence, it can easily force rebellious associations to accept their policies. The state also possesses extensive authority in terms of meddling in economic affairs at both the micro and the macro level. It has authority to “negotiate terms of trade, to legislate against economic rigidities, to alter the rate of involuntary savings through taxation, and to mobilise collective sentiments to ends which they deem necessary” (1999:91-92). In the same spirit, the state may completely on its own terms provide for massive enterprises such as educational and infrastructural systems which will never generate any direct financial dividends.

Now, in the face of industrialisation, and a perceived setting of a world consistent with the social development of the diffusion model, such inequalities as have been discussed above should ideally evaporate in the long run. Hechter, however, rejects this idea. The logic explaining this rejection is rooted in the fact that regional economic cleavages in many industrialised societies are intense to the point where these inequalities are likely to have significant long-term political implications regardless of their initiated industrial process. It is so, because secessionist movements are commonly solidified on dual claims of economic and cultural discrimination against peripheral regions believed to have been originated from the centralised government. The complexity of regional economic inequalities in the modern industrial society cannot be stressed too much, because even though the industrial process engenders a considerable increase with regards to interregional transactions, which consequently broadens the factual extent for the scope of national markets, it is certainly miscalculating to take for granted any increased welfare in the peripheral region on behalf of the core (1999:129-130).

As we now have an idea about how persistent economic regional inequalities are established, the time has thus arrived when we must ask ourselves how nationalism becomes its embodiment. Hechter’s theory suggests that in situations where cultural subordination is superimposed upon an economic disadvantage, and where the centralised government simultaneously is failing to address such a situation, which ultimately denies the economic inequality to be reversed, then that is certainly a time when cultural solidarity increasingly materialises, and where regional political self-determination becomes the demand, manifested as a nationalist movement (1999:309-310). From all that has been deliberated in this section, four economic components of nationalist arguments which confine the analytical framework have been derived here. They are; Terms of Trade, Economic Dependency, Economic Exploitation, and Labour Market.

3.3 Gellner's Theory - The Socio-Cultural

Gellner's theory on nationalism (2006) begins with the notion that nationalism as a sentiment, or as an expression of national identity, *does not* have its origin in the existence of the nation. On the contrary, nationalism creates nations where there previously were none, and is able to do so only because of the transition from a previous agrarian society into a complex, large-scale industrial society. The industrial society is significantly different from the previous agrarian society, where the structure of immobile social positions allowed for people to be identified in terms of that structure, whereas the system of the industrial society is characterised by a career-driven structure within its division of labour with perpetual mobility as its hallmark. Consequently, this excludes the possibility for a person to be completely identified by a position within that structure, and therefore, it is culture which gives a person his identity rather than the land. The perpetual mobility of the structure creates a dire need for the entire population to be furnished with a standardised set of skills, where a standardised style of communication learned through a mass-education, provided for by the centralised administrative institution, that is the state, is the key-feature in shaping a standardised 'high culture'. This intertwined union of the state, the people and the culture thus become manifested as the national identity in the age of industrialism. Industrial society, however, is not a manifestation of equality, which by necessity means that there are those who have gained from industrial development at the expense of others. Now, should these two opposite segments of society be of uniform culture, then that would not be an issue for our purposes here, but if they are not, and should the circumstances favour heightened focus on cultural differences, then this is when nationalism erects itself, either through assimilation and a unionist kind of nationalism - or through demands for political self-determination and a secessionist kind of nationalism - by those who are part of the unfavoured culture.

To gain a deeper understanding of Gellner's theory, however, we must fragment it further. Firstly, it is important to point to his notion on the industrialist spirit as one that is highly affected by a belief in a rationality which has developed from entrepreneurial efficiency and bureaucratic orderliness (2006:20). It is important because this rationality will ultimately explain the *modus operandi* of the industrial society, in terms of the utilisation of its means to its ends. Gellner argues that the very root of nationalism is the forever changing and forever expanding division of labour which characterises the industrial society. The consequence of such a division of labour is two-fold because it means, on the one hand, that those who are part of it cannot calmly expect to remain within the same occupational compartment

throughout their entire career, and on the other, that the mobility which it requires in its desperate need for economic expansion, engenders an expected egalitarianism which serves to hamstring any possible tensions. After all, inequalities can be accepted as long as there exists at least an illusion of social mobility. This raises the issue of the prerequisites for mobility within the industrial division of labour. Gellner (2006:27) uses the analogy of a modern army to illustrate his point that specialisation in the modern society stems from an infrastructure of unspecialised and standardised education. Just like the modern army, modern society supplies, through the centralised educational system, a shared set of generic and standardised skills to all of its members, only here the skills are of a communicational nature rather than a combative one. The intention is that anyone who has graduated from such a programme should possess the skills necessary to be easily mobile within the industrial division of labour, and this is of great significance because it enables what Gellner calls “the centralised method of reproduction” (2006:29), which ultimately ensures continuous cultural universality among the populace. As such, the loyalties of the people in the modern society lies not with God, the King and the land, but instead with the high culture of the industrial society. Gellner’s rationale is that a person’s prospects for employment - and therefore his dignity, security and self-respect - are indeed dependent on his education, and as is discussed above, it is education, an infrastructure so colossal that it can only be provided for by the state, that engenders the high culture to which the people can belong and identify themselves. By necessity, this means that “the organization of human groups into large, centrally educated, culturally homogenous units”, shielded by their own state, is imperative for the emergence of nationalism (2006:34).

The calculated high culture of the industrial society, delivered by the national educational and communications system, could not exist without its very own political infrastructure and the only effective operator of that infrastructure is the state. Gellner (2006:54 & 62) claims that this link between the state and the common culture, and thus the ‘wholeness’ of the society, increases the significance of the idea of the nation, which is manifested as the legitimacy of the political community. But what happens if the commonality of the culture is disrupted, and hence, that the mobility within the division of labour becomes hampered? Gellner recognises, that regardless of the commonality of culture and a sense of wholeness of society, people will always be different. For example, people might have immigrated into the society, carrying with them a foreign culture which they are reluctant to give up, or they might have physical features which make them stand out. It might also be the case that the current culture has been superimposed upon a previous one, when territory has been acquired either through conquest,

annexation or cession. In industrial society it is the state that wields the preservation and the management of the social infrastructure, of which the standardised education is an essential part, and the conservation of the medium of culture and communication is the fundamental function of education. The consequence thus becomes that the people can only function within the frame of that culture- and communications medium, which extends to the territory of the state and its educational-cultural machinery. The ultimate function, however, of the intertwined relationship between the state, the people and the culture, is to produce worthy, loyal and efficient participants to the total society, which will serve the purpose of absorbing any potential sub-cultures, and this is of utmost importance because this is how national identity is engendered, and hence, how the problem of immobility within the system is embodied (2006:62-63).

On the backdrop of what has previously been discussed, should a situation occur where a cultural minority displays reluctance towards assimilation into the dominant culture, and should this group simultaneously display obstinance with regards to equable dispersion within the system, that is, immobility either at the top- or bottom stratum of the industrial society, then that will most certainly create socio-cultural disruptions which will raise societal barriers intended to further restrict the minority culture's prospects for political power. Accordingly, it is here that cultural, and ultimately, political nationalism, comes at full display. Now, if the cultural minority is one which has migrated into the industrial society of high culture, and the issue of mobility rests mainly on socio-cultural communication hardships, then nationalism is generally manifested through assimilation of the minority into the pool of the dominant common culture. Regardless of how problematic such a process might be, this type of unionist nationalism is surely preferred by the high culture. Should the situation be such, however, that the dominant common culture, either through conquest, annexation or cession, has been superimposed on the cultural minority, and that their national identity engenders socio-cultural communication issues which excludes them from mobility within the system, then that may very well take the expression of reluctance towards cultural assimilation, and hence, raise the demand for political self-determination in the form of secessionist nationalism, which might possibly be one of the most alarming hazards for the industrial society (2006:65-69).

To summarise this argument, then, Gellner's claim is that nationalism is about access to, presence in, and identification with an educated and dominant common culture which is coterminous with a complete political unit and its whole population. The reason for this is

that such a structure is imperative if it is to function properly with its division of labour, which constitutes the very foundation of this society where communication is of the essence (2006:92). It should be noted, if not for anything else then at least for the sake of clarity, with regard to the immense focus Gellner has on the concept of communication that this does not simply refer to the language which is used in direct interaction between people, but that it also refers to the modern feature of communications which is the mass media. It is a mistake according to Gellner (2006:121-122), to assume that nationalism is an existing idea which modern mass media delivers to audiences which would never have heard of it in the age of the agrarian society. Rather, it is the media in itself, through their language and their “abstract, centralised, standardised, one-to-many” type of communication, which sends the message that it is only those who can understand them, or those who can achieve such understanding, that are included in the community, and that those who cannot, as such, are excluded. Therefore, the situation is such that modern mass media is not only of importance for the existence of nationalism, but rather that it is an absolute necessity, because it is by itself one of the cornerstones in its construction.

Out of what has been considered with regards to Gellner’s theory, there are four socio-cultural components of nationalist arguments which stand in the analytical framework that have been derived from this section. They are; Communication, Common Culture, Social Mobility, and Education.

3.4 Modernist Nationalism and its Relevance for Secessionism

Whilst secession can be defined in several ways, in the context of Scotland and Wales we will be using the most common definition that refers to secession as the creation of a new state by the separation of a geographical territory and its population from its current state. Whereas the components of this process may vary, such as if the components are violent, or if secession takes place by peaceful means, the end goal involves the previous nation losing sovereignty in favour of the newly created state. In essence, this does not only mean that political control of the territory will be passed to the new state, but also that the new state will seek recognition of its political authority, both from other states, as well as from its former state (Pavkovic & Radan 2007:5-10).

According to Wood (1981, cited in Pavkovic & Radan, 2007:176-177), nationalism as an ideology, is utilised by almost all secessionist movements. Wood also organizes the conditions required for secession to take place into several categories. The first, is that in

order for any secessionist movement to take off, an alienation between the population of a specific area and what is regarded as the host population needs to take place. In political terms, it is common for the alienated population not to consider the political authority of the host state as legitimate. In addition to this, the alienated populace will require a distinct geographic area as well as social differences. Ethnicity is one of the most common social differences found within secessionist movements, which often includes a common language and a common history. Other prerequisites for secession are economic reasons, where the alienated group feel that they are either suffering economically in relation to the host population, or that the host population is benefiting from their economic success to a larger extent than can be justified. Finally, there are often psychological reasons which fuel secessionist movements such as emotional desires for a nation of their own, or situations where other groups are perceived as either a threat or the recipients of favoured treatment. These psychological reasons provide the foundation for the sub-questions of this study and are utilised in the analytical framework.

Nationalist ideology is not the only similarity between modernist-nationalist theories and Wood's secessionist theory. In fact, Wood's preconditions for secessionism align very well with those of modernist nationalism. In the politico-ideological subcategory, the prevalent theme is political power and the arguments justifying the seizure of said political power. No matter what variation or conditions of secessionism that are in question, the core concept within secessionism is to seize supreme political authority over a geographic territory. Likewise, the preconditions within Wood's theory on secessionism utilises similar economic arguments as those found within the modernist-nationalist economic subcategory. Specifically, this entails unfavourable or outright exploitative conditions that not only warrant, but also require, self-determination so as to avoid economic stagnation or to fully take advantage of the perceived economic potential within the geographic territory. The socio-cultural arguments within both the secessionist theory on preconditions, as well as the modernist-nationalist theory, align with each other as well, in essence, attempting to justify the need to acquire supreme political authority, due to either a threat or a hindered advancement of heritage, cultural practices or incongruent ethnic traits. Ultimately, we find that these strong similarities between the secessionist preconditions discussed by Wood and the modernist-nationalist theories, which have been discussed at length within this chapter, affirm the application of modernist theories on nationalism when utilised in a secessionist context.

3.5 Analytical Framework

In this section it is our aim to present the operational definitions derived from the chosen theories which will guide specifically what we will look for in the statements that will be analysed. As has been previously discussed, we are working with three sub-categories within the modernist approach to nationalism which have all been discussed at length in sections 3.1-3.3, and they are horizontally presented in the analytical framework, aiming to explore how the arguments for Scottish and Welsh secession can be linked to the modernist-nationalist thoughts. Presented vertically, are the sub-questions derived from section 3.4, which serves as a set of tools to answer the principal research question.

Table 1- Analytical Framework

<p>Components of Nationalist Arguments →</p> <p>Questions driving Secessionism</p> <p>↓</p>	<p><i>Politico-Ideological</i></p> <p>Power</p> <p>Mobilisation</p> <p>Class</p> <p>Ideological</p> <p>Symbolic</p>	<p><i>Economic</i></p> <p>Terms of Trade</p> <p>Economic Dependency</p> <p>Economic Exploitation</p> <p>Labour Market</p>	<p><i>Socio-Cultural</i></p> <p>Communication</p> <p>Common Culture</p> <p>Social Mobility</p> <p>Education</p>
<p>What, that is rightfully ours, is being denied to us?</p>	<p>Our right to self-determination and political authority over our lands, resources and people.</p>	<p>Economic stability, development and prosperity for our nation, people and labour force.</p>	<p>The safeguarding and promotion of our traditions and practises.</p>
<p>What if we do not secede?</p>	<p>We will continue to be ruled by a foreign government, the political conditions of which, will perpetually keep us as a political minority.</p>	<p>Economic stagnation, increasingly higher unemployment and unfavourable trade agreements.</p>	<p>Our heritage, traditions and communicative skillsets will continue to be suppressed.</p>
<p>What do we expect out of secession?</p>	<p>For our nation to be ruled by its own people and to be able to foster diplomatic relationships of our own choosing.</p>	<p>Economic prosperity, more beneficial trade and utilization of our resources. Less unemployment and an increasingly skilled labour force.</p>	<p>To be able to cultivate our national identity, shared values and a standardized education system that adhere to our requirements.</p>

4. Specified Aim & Research Questions

The aim of this thesis is to explore, through the application of modernist-nationalist theories on arguments for secession made by the SNP and PC, how nationalist arguments are utilised to make a claim for secession. Specifically, we aim to find out how these nationalist arguments are utilised within the political assemblies of Scotland and Wales so as to ensure arguments from the highest political instance possible for the purposes of this study.

Principal Research Question:

- How are different forms of nationalist arguments utilised by the secessionist political parties within the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly?

Sub-Questions:

Within the three sub-categories; the politico-ideological, the economic, and the socio-cultural, we will be asking the following sub-questions;

- What, that is rightfully ours, is being denied to us?
- What if we do not secede?
- What do we expect out of secession?

5. Research Design & Methods

In order to answer our research question and the subsequent sub-questions, this study conducts a comparative case study on two cases, guided by two repeated qualitative textual content analyses of official documents on the debates within the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. The results, with regards to the utilisation of our analytical framework, are then to be compared between the two cases. Our aim is to gain a better understanding of the different nationalist characteristics of the arguments made in the context of what can be interpreted as secessionist by the SNP and PC, and to explore how they compare. To reach this aim, we have conducted a qualitative comparative case study. In this chapter we will argue, first, for our selection of design, and then our data collection- and data analysis methods, in that following order, and thereby explain how we aim to approach the analyses.

5.1 Comparative Case Study

As has been previously addressed, the cases of analyses for this study are two outspoken secessionist political parties within the political assemblages of the nations of Scotland and Wales, and that our two-folded aim is to gain a better understanding of how nationalist arguments within the three theoretical sub-categories are utilised in the context of what can be interpreted as making a case for secession, as well as how the arguments made by the SNP and PC compare. Consequently, and which has been highlighted above, this study is conducted as a comparative case study.

The key benefit of conducting a single case study is that the examination can be conducted intensively and in-depth. Also, it carries the possibility to advance arguments and theories which are of interest to other circumstances than that of the specific case under investigation (Halperin & Heath, 2017:214). A comparative case study, on the other hand, may very well share all the features of a single case study but it also opens up for the possibilities to explore the contrasts, similarities, differences and patterns between cases (Campbell, 2012:174). Any well-performed case study should add something interesting and important with regard to the specific case, and consequently, contribute to the existing literature on the topic, referring to this specific case. One of the strengths of a case study is that it can narrow the focus of the research, and as such analyse that which is of interest, without distraction from factors outside of the scope for the study. By doing so, it should generate a strong internal validity of the findings (Halperin & Heath, 2017:174 & 214). However, it should also engross with the broader debates of academia and have as its goal to add something more general, which

would enable the findings of the study to be applied to other situations, meaning that the findings are applicable to other cases. In that way, the case becomes associated with a comparative context which should introduce theories and explanations which contain a hypothetical, yet always low, external validity (Halperin & Heath, 2017:174 & 214).

Nevertheless, and as is presented above, we are conducting a comparative case study with two separate cases, as ‘between-cases’ or a ‘cross-national systematic comparison’, containing repetitive analyses of both cases through the case study method, with the aim to make this study comparative beyond the scope of a single case study, as is recommended by Ryan K. Beasley & Juliet Kaarbo (1999:371-372). The main advantage of this approach is that it permits for the rich in-depth analysis which is the hallmark of the single case study while it simultaneously supplies a better range of generalisability, i.e. this allows for both the particular and the general to be included. There are, however, issues which must be considered when conducting comparisons, especially with regard to the hazard of engendering deceptive results. The key issue here is to provide distinct justifications for the selection of cases in order to avoid, to the greatest extent possible, the introduction of selection bias. Additionally, it is of the utmost importance to make sure, after the repeated analyses, that the comparative level is re-introduced for the ultimate conclusions and that the analytical framework makes theoretical sense (Campbell, 2012:175; Halperin & Heath, 2017:218). It is certainly so, that we could have averted such issues altogether, had we chosen to perform a deeper analysis, as a single case study, on either one of the two cases which serve as the units of analyses in this study. But they do share a number of commonalities, amongst other things a long-term subjection to the UK Parliament of Westminster and a shared aim for secession from the UK, and these commonalities, in combination with the fact that Scotland has held a referendum on independence whereas Wales has not, presents an idiosyncratic situation which we deem noteworthy to the point where anything but a comparison would have appeared unwarranted.

A combination of similarities and differences serve well to prevent redundancy and as fertilisers for any field of research. Halperin & Heath (2017:217-218), argue that the observed patterns between the similarities and the differences of this world present variations which scientists can analyse to test theoretical expectations. For example, one could analyse different countries and the relationship between them, and how such a relationship may affect political phenomena. Given such a rationale, it could have been argued that we ought to have included Northern Ireland and its prominent secessionist party, Sinn Féin, into our analyses.

But given the extent of this study, and the historically infested relationship between the UK and Northern Ireland (Officer & Walker, 2000:293), we concluded that the analyses of the SNP and PC is sufficient for our purposes.

5.2 Political Statements

The data for our analyses consists of primary source material solely. The sources for the data are nationalist statements interpreted as aiming for secession, made in the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly by members of the SNP and PC, which have been collected from protocols available at the official websites of each institution. The fundamental reason for this choice is that statements and debates at a parliamentary level are at the top level with regard to political decisions made in Scotland and Wales, and therefore we argue that such an approach will most accurately disclose the arguments made in the political debate, without the potential distortion of a third party, for example, a journalist. Additionally, since these political statements are made and recorded, they will never change. The significance of this is that should anyone else approach this data with the same analytical framework which is utilised in this study, then they should in all likelihood achieve the same results, which means, ultimately, that this data selection holds a strong reliability (Halperin & Heath, 2017:174).

The point of reference for this study is the Scottish referendum on independence held on September 18, 2014. Our hunch was that debates on secession would have intensified in Scotland as the referendum came closer, and quite likely also in Wales due to the opportunity presented by the Scottish situation, and that the result of the referendum was a great cause of the debate in the aftermath. Therefore, we have approached and read all the available documents from the meetings in the chambers of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly during 2014 in the search for nationalist statements that can be interpreted as making a case for secession. In total, this amounts to 174 documents since the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly met at 107 and 67 occasions respectively during 2014 (The Scottish Parliament, 2019; National Assembly for Wales, 2019). Thereafter, the majority of the nationalist statements made during these sessions were rejected due to an inability to draw a clear connection to secession. From there, we further narrowed the data down by carefully searching for connections to the components of nationalist arguments from our theoretical framework until, ultimately, we narrowed it down to the thirteen statements which we thought presented the best arguments for the Scottish and the Welsh need for secession from the UK. We deem this process of collecting data reliable, and we also argue that this

approach allows us to address the topic as extensively as is possible given the scope of this study.

One issue that may potentially arise due to this selection, is that we might have missed any eventual points that would have been made in traditional or popular media, or anywhere else outside of the chambers of the Scottish Parliament or the Welsh Assembly for that matter, during this time period. This is a risk which we think is acceptable as it is counterweighted by the fact that any statements made in political parliaments and assemblies, to a great extent, can be seen as political speeches representing the party, rather than personal opinions.

5.3 Qualitative Textual Content Analyses

Based upon the analytical framework generated from the theoretical approach, the official documents collected from the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly have been analysed through the repeated qualitative textual content analyses. As is described in Halperin & Heath (2017:345-349) a qualitative textual content analysis entails the analysis of textual data in a systematic fashion. This systematic analysis can be done either as a qualitative or a quantitative one. A quantitative content analysis generally has its focus on surface information, that is, information that can be observed with general ease, and large amounts of it. In opposite fashion, the qualitative textual content analysis will look for deeper meaning from relatively smaller amounts. The difference between a qualitative and a quantitative content analysis then, is described as dependent on the questions asked that they in turn are trying to answer. This study is attempting to answer questions that require interpretation to a higher degree, therefore we have chosen the qualitative approach in order to interpret and identify nationalist arguments. But since we are conducting a comparative case study, we are interested in exploring the differences and similarities of how the nationalist arguments of each category are utilised between the two cases.

Halperin & Heath deliberate further and divide the process for utilising a textual content analysis into 4 steps (2017:346-349). The first is about deciding the population of text and what samples from that population are to be used. The data for this study contains motions and speeches made during debates within the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly, specifically between January 1- and December 31, 2014. The rationale for this selection is to work with data from a period that encompasses the Scottish referendum on independence held on 18 September 2014. From the population of text that this period provides, only statements, motions and speeches that can be interpreted as relating to secession by the secessionist

parties, the SNP & PC, have been analysed. The second revolves around assigning categories that help to answer what you are looking for. In our case these are the categories defined in the analytical framework. The third regards identifying what portions of the text that is being used as a recorded unit. For our study these are arguments made that can be framed as nationalist in character. Finally, the fourth covers how to identify the recorded units, and here, this is two-folded. Firstly, we needed to identify an argument as a secessionist one, and secondly, we needed to identify which type of nationalist argument it is, as it adheres to the three categories of nationalist arguments which have been defined in the analytical framework. They are:

1. Arguments of a politico-ideological character, stressing political or ideological reasons for secession
2. Arguments of an economic character, stressing economic reasons for secession
3. Arguments of a socio-cultural character, stressing social or cultural reasons for session

A problem which may present itself when performing a qualitative textual content analysis is the fashion in which the interpretations of the texts are being conducted (Halperin & Heath, 2017:355), and to avoid accusations of bias it is important to provide sufficient evidence for the interpretative claims which have been made (Steinberg, 2004:119-124). Accordingly, all the claims made in our analyses are backed up with reference to the theoretical chapter and we have tried to be as straightforward and transparent as possible with our interpretative process.

5.3.1 Coding

Coding is the method of how to identify and organize data in alignment with themes and a necessary process when conducting a qualitative textual content analysis. There are two main approaches to this method; priori and grounded codes. Grounded codes involve constructing themes based on the source material or data as it is being read. Priori codes on the other hand use themes based on theory or previous studies, and in this study, they are the components that we have depicted in the analytical framework. Whereas there are methods of using computer programs for computer-assisted coding, we have been using the manual approach. The statements from the source data have been organized and selected in accordance with the analytical framework. However, to ensure accuracy, the selected data and the themes have

been re-read and checked several times during the analytical process, as is recommended by Halperin & Heath (2017:349-351).

6. Analyses

In this chapter the repeated qualitative textual content analyses of the selected data are carried out in order to answer the principal research question; How are different forms of nationalist arguments utilised by the secessionist political parties within the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly? The process utilised here is focused on three specific theoretical sub-categories of nationalist arguments, namely; nationalist- politico-ideological, economic, and socio-cultural arguments, made by the SNP in the Scottish Parliament and by PC in the Welsh Assembly. All of these theoretical categories have been elaborated in detail in chapter 3, and stem directly from original work by Ernest Gellner, John Breuilly and Michael Hechter. Specifically, this led us to examine the data for the components of nationalist arguments that have been derived for each sub-category. They are; 1. Power, Mobilisation, Class, Ideological and Symbolic for the politico-ideological sub-category. 2. Terms of Trade, Economic Dependency, Economic Exploitation and Labour Market for the economic sub-category. 3. Communication, Common Culture, Social Mobility and Education for the socio-cultural sub-category.

In addition to that, after applying the theoretical framework to the selected data, we have also examined it, guided by the politico-ideological, economic, and socio-cultural sub-categories, in search for answers to the three sub-questions; 1. What, that is rightfully ours, is being denied to us? 2. What will happen if we do not secede? 3. What do we expect out of secession? The results of the repeated analyses of the selected two cases are then compared so that the differences and/or similarities between them can be utilised to answer the principal research question driving this study. Firstly, the analyses will focus on Scottish nationalist arguments made by the SNP, secondly, on Welsh nationalist arguments made by PC, and thirdly, the comparison of the results is presented.

To better accommodate our study to the given format, we decided to separate our findings according to our specific sub-categories. This has allowed us, in better detail, to explain the reasoning behind our interpretations and hopefully provide as much transparency as possible in our analytical process. We acknowledge the possibility that this might raise suspicions of selection bias, but the nature of the selected data does not fit well into a division by time or date apart from the year 2014 and its proximity to the Scottish Referendum of Independence.

6.1 Scottish Nationalist Arguments

What is presented here are seven statements made in the Scottish Parliament during 2014 which all have been analysed in accordance with the analytical framework presented in section 3.5. These statements are nationalist- politico-ideological, economic, and socio-cultural in character and are presented in that following order, and they are made by members of the SNP, trying to make their case as to why Scottish secession from the UK is in Scotland's best interest.

6.1.1 Scottish Nationalist Politico-Ideological Arguments

There are vast amounts of nationalist politico-ideological arguments made during 2014, highlighting not only the benefits of secession from the UK, but also the necessity of an independent Scottish nation-state, made by members of the SNP in the chamber meetings of the Scottish Parliament. The imposed restrictions of the Scottish Parliament in terms of being able to make political decisions that are in its own best interest, due to its subordinate position under the British Government in Westminster, is of great concern for the SNP members when they are making their case in favour of secession. During a debate on European Policies, a SNP member states;

1. "I want to see Scotland at the top table so that our demographic makeup and economic conditions are taken into consideration as unique entities. We have limited powers and it is clear that a gap exists between the Scottish Parliament's ability to scrutinise and its ability to act on issues that are brought up at Europe level. Indeed, where the Scottish Parliament has power, our policy position is often contrary to policies that are being pursued by the UK Government.... Finally, it is worth reminding members that this debate is taking place in the context of two referendums. One is the potential in/out referendum on the UK's membership of the European Union. It goes without saying that such a referendum would put Scotland's place under threat and could diminish our already limited voice on European matters. The second referendum is on whether Scotland should be an independent country. That referendum will give us the opportunity to have a full place at the top table, which will greatly enhance our voice on the international stage and give us the chance to make decisions as equals with our European friends and neighbours. I look forward to that decision being a yes." (The Scottish Parliament, Meeting of Parliament. Stewart Maxwell, SNP. Debate on European Union Policies: 2014-02-18)

The prevalent factor among the politico-ideological category of arguments is the pursuit and acquisition of political power. This is due to a need for a nation of a unique character to be as independent as possible. The SNP member is making that pursuit evident when highlighting both the current lack of political power as well as the need to attain full political sovereignty in order to achieve equal footing with other nations. In addition to the referendum on

independence that the SNP member mentions, the member also points out the potential threat of a UK referendum on membership of the EU which could, with a resulting UK exit, have further dire consequences for Scotland. This can be argued to align with the component of mobilisation, where an engagement in mass politics is required to achieve the political goals of independence.

When arguing as to how independence will propel Scotland to a higher level of global citizenship that will benefit the international community and cement Scotland's place on the international stage, a SNP member states;

2. "I agree that, in the current constitutional set-up, Scotland can play a role, but as an independent country with the full international and foreign totallylycily levers we could play a great role as a good global citizen. We have a great history. Dr David Livingstone was described as "Africa's first freedom fighter" by Kenneth Kaunda, the President of the Zambian Republic. We also have a great history of literature and culture. These famous lines are known to every member of the Scottish Parliament: "That Man to Man, the world o'er, shall brothers be for a' that." Regardless of race, religion and nationality, be it domestically or internationally, an independent Scotland will stand with the poorest in the world and will be a good global citizen." (The Scottish Parliament, Meeting of Parliament. Humza Yousaf, SNP. Debate on Scotland: A Good Global Citizen: 2014-04-01)

Whilst making the case for independence, the SNP member, during this debate, mentions one who is regarded a Scottish hero of the past together with lyrics from an old famous Scottish song. Utilising heroes and historical sentiments as a beacon as to what Scotland can become, the SNP member's argument aligns with the symbolic and ideological components, where the utilisation of historical sentiment is central within nationalist ideology and symbolism. In terms of what can be expected from independence, the SNP member is implying that not only would Scotland be a bulwark when supporting the poor abroad, but also, that Scotland will be able to help their own poor citizens.

6.1.2 Scottish Nationalist Economic Arguments

The idea that the Scottish economy is hamstrung in its endeavours to develop on its own terms, due to its inability to fully influence the decisions that is affecting it, is an ever-recurring theme in the SNP's arguments for a secessionist move. The dependency and the exploitation of the Scottish economy, as consequences of the economic agendas and policy making of the UK governments in Westminster, are frequently stressed reasons, not only in themselves but also in terms of how this subordinate position affects every aspect that has an impact on the Scottish economy, but also as for why an independent Scotland is the sound and prosperous way forward. EU funding for agriculture is no exception;

3. “If Scotland had been an independent country at the start of negotiations for the 2014 to 2019 EU agricultural budget, Scotland’s farmers and rural areas would, under the formula that was agreed and which applies to all member states, be €1 billion better off. Although a detailed breakdown is not available, it stands to reason that my Dumfries and Galloway constituents would be well placed to benefit from a substantial proportion of that €1 billion uplift and an above-average percentage of the 2,500 rural jobs that the Scottish Government has calculated the extra billion would create..... Although the situation right now is poor, there is also the prospect of a complete cut in agricultural support if Scotland remains in the political union with England and England votes to leave the EU in an in/out referendum. Scottish agriculture and our rural industries will be in the hands of a Westminster Government with a stated policy of drastically reducing or even ending farm payments altogether. That would be a disaster.” (The Scottish Parliament, Meeting of Parliament. Joan McAlpine, SNP. Debate on Common Agricultural Policy: 2014-01-29)

As was lifted forward in section 3.2, the peripheral economy is ever in a position of dependency towards the core economy. Here, the SNP member turns the focus towards the €1 billion in agricultural EU subsidies which would have come Scotland’s way, had it been an independent EU member. The element of dependency appears, firstly, in the fact that decisions regarding funding to Scottish agriculture lie, ultimately, in the Westminster government’s hands because Scotland is not a separate member state of the EU, but is only a member as a part of the UK and is therefore not qualified for direct EU funding. What Scotland receives is consequently dependent on what the UK government decides. Secondly, dependency appears with regards to the estimated 2500 job opportunities, which touches as well upon the component of labour market in the analytical framework in section 3.5, as those job opportunities would have been directly dependent on Scotland being a separate member of the EU as an independent country rather than a member as a part of the UK. Finally, dependence is also suggested with reference to the possibility of the UK leaving the EU, as the EU’s agricultural subsidies would disappear altogether and Scotland would not only lose its share of the EU funding which is up for distribution throughout the UK, but also quite likely lose, if not all, then at least a substantial share of its “farm payments”, due to suggested economic policy implementation by the Westminster government. The stated policy of drastically reducing or even ending “farm payments” altogether can also be interpreted, in terms of what has been deliberated in section 3.2, as a form of economic exploitation through political incorporation, even though that is not specifically expressed by the SNP member. As economic dependency and exploitation are pervading themes running through the SNP’s arguments for Scottish secession, there are also arguments which do not solely focus on the economic perils of remaining in the UK, but argue on a more positive note, for the opportunities that await an independent Scotland;

4. “Our economic case for independence has at its heart a plan to improve business conditions and to reindustrialise Scotland through initiatives such as using our new tax powers to support high-value manufacturing and key sectors that are vital to the Scottish economy; boosting innovation through the establishment of an innovation agency; encouraging and motivating greater private sector investment in research and development; integrating skills and employability by bringing together job matching, employability training and career guidance; improving access to finance through a Scottish business development bank; and expanding our international presence and reach by using a network of overseas embassies that will be dedicated to boosting Scottish exports. Those are just some of the measures that the Government of an independent Scotland could take to strengthen our economic foundations.” (The Scottish Parliament, Meeting of Parliament. John Swinney, SNP. Debate on Economic Opportunities of Independence: 2014-08-12)

With regards to the analytical framework presented in section 3.5, the components of nationalist arguments; labour market and terms of trade appear quite clearly here. “Integrating skills and employability by bringing together job matching, employability training and career guidance” is a phrasing which hardly can be interpreted as anything else than a belief that an independent Scotland will work favourably for an increased participation in the Scottish labour market. If we shift the attention towards the phrasing “expanding our international presence and reach by using a network of overseas embassies that will be dedicated to boosting Scottish exports”, then that expresses the opportunity for an independent Scotland to be able to negotiate terms of trade with potential trading partners on their own terms rather than if their interests were to continue to be represented by a UK government. But what is perhaps even more interesting with this argument is what can be perceived to be implied. Phrases such as “improve business conditions”, “support high-value manufacturing”, “boosting innovation” and “motivating greater private sector investment” all seem to speak for a long awaited opportunity to come out from under the situation of economic dependency and exploitation elaborated in section 3.2.

Following such reasoning, another argument is made by the SNP;

5. “The financial benefits of successful employment initiatives by the Scottish Government will mean savings in welfare payments and increased tax receipts, which will flow into the Scottish exchequer and not Westminster, as at present. That will mean that the increased revenue can be reinvested in the people of Scotland to fund more employment initiatives and develop more targeted labour market policies that suit Scotland.” (The Scottish Parliament, Meeting of Parliament. Gordon MacDonald, SNP. Debate on European Youth Guarantee: 2014-03-19)

This statement adds to the perception that economic dependency and exploitation are the reasons as to why Scotland has not yet reached its full economic potential, and why its people are not enjoying the standard of living they deserve.

6.1.3 Scottish Nationalist Socio-Cultural Arguments

In a similar manner to the nationalist economic arguments, the nationalist arguments of a socio-cultural disposition made by the SNP stress, to a large degree, the inability for Scotland to come out from under the current societal arrangements dictated by the UK government of Westminster. It is certainly so, that the members of the SNP perceive a secessionist move for total independence as the remedy for many of the inequalities which haunt Scottish society. In a debate on the educational attainment gap we hear;

6. “As I said in my response to Johann Lamont earlier, only with the full economic powers of independence will we be able to do everything that is required to tackle the root causes of poverty and close the attainment gap. Our commitment to improving attainment has a firm foundation in all our key policies and programmes that affect children and young people, including curriculum for excellence, teaching Scotland’s future, getting it right for every child, the early years framework and opportunities for all. Those policies clearly set out what needs to be done—and is being done—to support every child and young person’s successful learning journey.” (The Scottish Parliament, Meeting of Parliament. Michael Russel, SNP. Debate on the Educational Attainment Gap: 2014-05-14)

Although this statement refers to economic powers that will be obtained with independence, and as such is made within an economic context, we have interpreted it as socio-cultural. This is due to a clear connection between two of the components of nationalist arguments from the theoretical framework in section 3.5, namely; education and social mobility. Also, we are suggesting that the components; common culture and communication, can be identified here as well. As has been discussed in section 3.3, the need for the entire population of a society to possess a standardised set of skills to be able to be mobile within the societal structure, hinges ultimately on a state provided standardised education. When the situation is such that there exists an attainment gap in the educational system, denying children from poorer strata of society the possibility to rise out of poverty as is suggested in the statement above, then that does mean, not only that there has been a failure by the state in providing a standardised education, but also that such failure is the very reason for the constrained social mobility. The SNP member is clearly implying that independence would allow Scotland to address the cause of the attainment gap. According to the theoretical assumptions guiding this section of the analyses, educating the populace for the purpose of providing them with the standardised

form of communication which is necessary in order to be mobile within the societal structure, is how a common culture is achieved. It is also so, that the theoretical assumptions here are suggesting that the intertwined relationship between the state, the populace, and the culture, ultimately, engenders the national identity. Now, as the SNP sees Scotland as a cultural minority within the UK, should the national identity of the Scottish populace be perceived to be the reason as to why mobility within the system is being denied to them, then that would theoretically explain the SNP's secessionist position.

The issue of communication is one which could come in different forms. Obviously, it could concern the language that people within any given society utilises in their face-to-face interactions with each other, but it can also come as the concern for communicative mediums, such as television, the radio or newspapers. In the upcoming statement, the concern of the SNP member lies with television broadcasting;

7. "The alternative that is proposed for channel 7 is that it be used for BBC 1 +1, which by its very nature will be a repeat channel with no original content, and very little of its content will have emanated from Scotland. That is unacceptable and, if the proposal is allowed to go ahead unchanged, it will again highlight why broadcasting in Scotland should be regulated by the Scottish Parliament." (The Scottish Parliament, Meeting of Parliament. Gordon MacDonald, SNP. Debate on Local Television: 2014-05-29)

As was indicated above, this statement is concerned with television broadcasting, and as such, it touches upon the component of nationalist arguments; communication. With regards to the theoretical assumptions presented in section 3.4, the phrasing; "no original content, and very little of its content will have emanated from Scotland", is interesting for our purposes here because, theoretically, nationalism is not an existing political message transmitted by mass media, but rather, mass media is one of the crucial pieces for the emergence of nationalism. As such, the phrasing in question here fits well with the theoretical assumption that the one controlling the contents of mass media, in terms of who it is that can achieve an understanding of its message, can wield a significant influence over who it is that will feel included in, or excluded from, the national community. The implication of the statement made by the SNP member, is that with independence, broadcasting in Scotland will be under the control of the Scottish government as opposed to the current control exercised by the UK government. As such, this statement can be interpreted to have a politico-ideological character within its socio-cultural disposition.

6.2 Welsh Nationalist Arguments

Similar to the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly is also subjugated to the government in Westminster. However, Welsh politics finds itself not specifically focusing its discussions on independence, but rather, on further devolution of powers from the UK government. In this section, six statements are analysed to answer how PC construct its arguments for further devolution as a steppingstone towards secession. The statements will be presented in the same order as the analysis of the Scottish nationalist arguments with regard to theoretical sub-categories.

6.2.1 Welsh Nationalist Politico-Ideological Arguments

In the Welsh Assembly, despite the long-term PC aspiration of achieving independence, the nationalist arguments are prevalently centred on a devolution of powers from the UK. A commission often referred to as the Silk Commission had just investigated devolution, its report is referenced frequently as in this case during a debate on the Silk report;

8. “As I have said in a previous debate in this Chamber, Plaid Cymru believes in having as much self-government as possible in any scenario. Plaid Cymru in Government could make use of the powers that the Silk commission has recommended for devolution and, ultimately, we believe that decisions over policing, transport, energy and water supplies, which are all recommended for devolution by the Silk commission, should be taken in Wales. If that would lead to a larger National Assembly, then we should be bold and set out that power is shifting from Westminster to this place as part of a changing Britain and a more confident Wales. The next five years should be a period of Wales moving forward, rather than a period that sees Wales left behind.” (National Assembly for Wales, Record of Proceedings. Leanne Wood, PC. Debate on the Second Report of the Silk Commission on Devolution: 2014-04-29)

In this statement, the PC member clearly states the aspirations of acquiring as much power as possible for the Welsh government as well as for that government to be led by PC. Whilst utilising what is for PC an external report as a justification for further devolution of power, the PC member is in alignment with the component of power from section 3.1, stating that the nation must be as independent as possible. Arguably, the component of mobilisation from section 3.5 is also utilised by the PC member when claiming that a shift in power from Westminster to Wales will result in a more confident Wales, a notion that whilst abstract in nature nevertheless corresponds with engagement of mass politics. The PC member continues to support this notion of mass politics by stating that for the next five years Wales should move forward or risk being left behind, implying that if the goal of a shift of power does not come to fruition, Wales is faced with stagnation.

When painting a picture of the nationalist politico-ideological arguments in the Welsh Assembly, a common theme concerning illegitimacy can be found. The case for this is made by the PC who states;

9. “We have to bear in mind that Wales today is an infinitely more confident, successful and progressive nation than it was 15 years ago. Of that I have no doubt, and I have no doubt that devolution has played its part in that. I have no doubt either that it is far better to have an elected Welsh Government, albeit that it has been Labour for 15 years, or even if the people of Wales ever decided that it would be Conservative for 15 years, than governance straight from London by colonial rule—by Governments that are not ever elected by the people of Wales.” (National Assembly for Wales, The Record of Proceedings. Simon Thomas, PC. Debate on Welsh Labour Policy Performance: 2014-05-21)

Whereas the power component as mentioned in section 3.1 does not entail legitimacy as a standalone concept, it can instead be found within the assertions that the power component is based upon, one of which states that “the interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values”. So, when considering Wales as a unique entity, it is deemed a requisite for Wales to be as independent as possible in order for PC to regard it as being politically legitimate. Whilst PC is arguing that the devolution of powers is partially responsible for Welsh prosperity over the prior 15 years, the PC member further attempts to strengthen the case for Welsh political sovereignty through discrediting the UK government by referring to the governance from Westminster as a colonial rule. As such, the PC member is effectively implying the rule from London as illegitimate.

6.2.2 Welsh Nationalist Economic Arguments

Much like the nationalist politico-ideological arguments made by PC, their nationalist economic arguments do not necessarily focus on independence, but rather the secessionist aspirations appear as arguments for extended autonomy in the form of further devolution of powers over decisions concerning their economic situation. With regards to the situation of the skills of the Welsh labour force, a member of PC says;

10. “I am grateful to the Deputy Minister for his statement today. I welcome the steps that have been set out in the plan as outlined, but many questions still remain. As we have just heard, there is a skills gap in Wales—between Wales and the rest of Britain and between Wales and the western world. The Deputy Minister has just acknowledged that and has recognised that we need to invest in order to address this skills gap” (National Assembly for Wales, Record of Proceedings. Simon Thomas, PC. Statement: The Skills Implementation Plan: 2014-07-15)

What is presented here is an argument which clearly concerns itself with a labour market that is lagging behind in terms of its relative skillset. The phrasings “many questions still remain”

and “we need to invest in order to address this skills gap”, both suggest that the current subordinate position of the Welsh economy will continue to work against a desired future characterised by a properly skilled Welsh labour force. The labour market component of nationalist arguments in section 3.5 is therefore marked here and looking at this argument from the theoretical assumptions in section 3.2, then that opens up for further linkages. It is said in section 3.2, that specialisation within the peripheral economy is limited to very few sectors because such a situation further consolidates the peripheral economy’s dependency upon the economy of the core, as such, we argue that the nationalist argument component; economic dependency, is suggested here. The labour market is perhaps not a sector of the economy in that sense, but a lesser specialised labour force in the peripheral economy would certainly not work in the peripheral economy’s favour should they aim to break out of their dependent position. It is further laid out that economic dependence serves as a justification for cultural discrimination which is something that PC strongly suggests is at full display in Wales and which shall be discussed more intimately in the next section. However, when economic dependency and cultural discrimination are simultaneously imposed on the periphery, then that establishes, in line with the theoretical assumptions of section 3.2, a cultural division of labour, which is imperative for the development and the determination of national identities in the core/peripheral relationship. As such, a Welsh “skills gap” makes theoretical sense as a manifestation of economic dependency and cultural discrimination.

Whilst the argument made by the PC member in the statement above is very nuanced in terms of why further devolution and ultimately secession is required to address the issues mentioned, the context becomes clear when considered in relation to the following statement;

11. “You know full well that we want Wales to become an independent country. We also want to end Wales’s financial dependence. How can we do that with one hand tied behind our back and a Government that will not fight for the best option for Wales? Next week, First Minister, we can expect the Chancellor to confirm his austerity agenda during the autumn statement. More pain is coming to Wales in the form of cuts to public services. I am sure that you will not miss an opportunity to attack the coalition’s plans. However, how can you do that while refusing to even try to win a fair funding arrangement based on Wales being treated equally with Scotland? You will not join me in working to secure an additional £1.2 billion for Welsh public services and for our economy, so will you tell us this afternoon what estimate your Government has made of Wales’s funding shortfall in comparison with Scotland? Have you even bothered to try working that out?” (National Assembly for Wales, Record of Proceedings. Leanne Wood, PC. Questions to the First Minister: 2014-11-25)

The component of nationalist arguments found in the analytical framework of section 3.5; economic dependence, is explicitly expressed in this statement and it is lined up directly after

the PC member talks about the party's desire for Wales to become an independent country. It follows from the theoretical assumptions presented in section 3.2, that an end to the subordinate position of economic dependence will not come about for as long as the colonial suppression persists. On the contrary, regional inequalities, in the long-term, are said to foster secessionist movements in the periphery whose self-perceived legitimacy rests on the claim that the centralised government in the core region is exercising economic and cultural discrimination which effectively is blocking the development of the peripheral economy. The nationalist argument component; economic exploitation, is also implied here as the PC member suggests that the Welsh economy is suffering because the UK government is treating it as if the poor economic situation in Wales is comparable to that of another peripheral region, namely Scotland. In addition to that, we would also argue that the component of nationalist arguments; labour market, is insinuated in the statement above. It is not farfetched to assume that the £1.2 billion suggested to possibly come at the disposal of the Welsh public services and the Welsh economy would go a long way to create job opportunities within the public sector of Wales.

6.2.3 Welsh Nationalist Socio-Cultural Arguments

Education, language and communication are all prevalently featured among the nationalist socio-cultural arguments within the Welsh Assembly. Specifically, the organisation and handling of English and Welsh languages within the Welsh educational system is a highly debated issue, on which PC stated;

12. "I declare an interest as another Member who visited CERN last week. I saw for myself the great work being undertaken by a number of institutions in Wales, but also—importantly—by a number of individual Welsh scientists there. Wales is well represented in CERN; in particular, I say to the Minister that Welsh-speaking scientists are represented in CERN. Scientists who know the difference between a neutron and a proton are represented in CERN, and scientists who have had their education through the medium of Welsh are responsible for some of the most highly technical engineering projects in the world. In that context, the comments of the vice chair of the Conservative party, that teaching science through the medium of Welsh is holding back Welsh education, are bad for Welsh science, bad for the image of Wales and bad for Wales in CERN. I hope that you would agree with me, Minister, that Michael Fabricant should go to CERN himself, see what Welsh scientists are doing there, and perhaps be bombarded with some particles to knock some sense into him" (National Assembly for Wales, Record of Proceedings. Simon Thomas, PC. Questions to the Minister for Economy, Science and Transport: 2014-01-29)

In statement 12, the PC member is making a case for education in the Welsh language, applying examples of recipients of the former whom have reached the highest echelons in the

scientific world. This argument is being made as a response to a member of the conservative party, which at this time held power in Westminster. The PC member is stating that the Conservative member is claiming that the Welsh language is holding back Welsh education and is bad for Wales overall. This can be perceived as a suppression of the Welsh national identity, heritage and traditions. This statement features two intertwined components; education and communication, that in section 3.3 is discussed in terms of how a standardised education is an essential component of the social infrastructure. In turn, education at its core is tasked with the preservation of culture and communication. It is hence quite clear, that the PC member is interested in both a standardised educational system as well as for that educational system to be accessible through the Welsh language. As the PC member highlights the success of Welsh-speaking scientists, then clearly the Welsh language cannot fully be an obstacle to social mobility. But the Welsh language is also implied to be suppressed, which would stand to reason that regardless of the success of the few, social mobility is still perceived as being denied to the greater number of the Welsh-speaking people of Wales.

Whilst the statement does not clearly state the situation discussed over the Welsh language as a reason for secession, we can deduce how this statement and the arguments on the Welsh language do serve PC's long-term goal of independence by utilising section 3.3, which states that when the dominant common culture has been superimposed on the cultural minority and their national identity incites socio-cultural communication issues which impede them from mobility, it may very well take the expression of reluctance towards cultural assimilation and raise the demand for political self-determination in the form of secessionist nationalism.

In other words, the statement above can be seen to serve the purpose of increasing popular support for the secessionist movement in general and secession in particular. This is further made evident in statement 13, where the situation of the Welsh-Speaking communities is elaborated on further;

13. "We in Wales already have a geographical pattern that is different to that which we inherited in the past, with city regions and economic growth areas being established. We need to ensure that, in making these developments, there is a role for Welsh-speaking communities to develop and strengthen the economy in terms of developing the Welsh language. These are all things that need to be reflected in the approach to these new developments. We have had lines on the maps for many hundreds of years in Wales that have all reflected the need to divide, not the need to unite us. They were purposely put in place to divide the Welsh nation initially. Although we have made them work, they are not lines on a map that unite us or that work well with national Government. The institutions of the National Assembly and a national Government now give us the opportunity to have regional and local government that

work well with national Government” (National Assembly for Wales, Record of Proceedings. Simon Thomas, PC. Debate on Public Service Governance and Delivery: 2014-07-02)

The argument made by the PC member could be interpreted to be partially economic in character, however, in the overall context of the ambitions of PC for the Welsh language, the Welsh language arguments are multifaceted. As discussed in section 3.3, a standardised set of skills, learned through a standardised educational system as provided by the state are paramount features when shaping a common culture, which is one of the components of nationalist arguments for this sub-category. The meaning of this is that the Welsh language plays a prominent part in shaping a national identity, and as such, that the members of PC are eager to see the Welsh-speaking communities playing a wider role in the development of Wales. By referencing historical transgressions where Welsh-speaking communities were separated, the PC member is advocating the Welsh national identity as being part of the solution and in clear contrast towards the implied transgressor of Westminster. However, the key for the Welsh national identity to progress, is for the Welsh language to continue to be developed across the socio-geographic divides created by Westminster. Yet as the PC member recognises that the launching of the current institutions of the Welsh Assembly and a Welsh government are serving Wales well, such a development would suggest that a secessionist move for independence is the next logical step in order to unite the Welsh-speaking people.

6.3. The Comparison of the Results

In this section, the results of the repeated analyses executed on the nationalist- politico-ideological, economic, and socio-cultural arguments aiming for secession made by the SNP and PC are compared. The comparison discusses each of the three above mentioned theoretical sub-categories separately for generating clarity to the greatest extent possible. Within each sub-category we are contrasting the corresponding results of the analyses, which are subsequently based upon the sub-questions as stated in chapter 4. Whereas there are various similarities and differences within each sub-category, there are a few comprehensive differences that must be acknowledged. Due to Scotland’s proximity to a referendum on independence, unsurprisingly, the nationalist arguments made by the SNP are heavily centred on the concept of independence. Wales, on the other hand, is further behind Scotland in the process of devolution of powers, with no referendum on independence on the horizon, and as such, PC is by contrast heavily engaged in discussions on devolution. However, based upon previously discussed theories within the corresponding sub-categories, the main assumption

regarding this difference remains that the Welsh process of devolution is viewed by PC as a path towards a desired independence.

6.3.1. Comparison of the Nationalist Politico-Ideological Arguments

Within the politico-ideological category, the SNP's pursuit of secession is clear. They argue that independence is a necessity in order for Scotland to be on equal terms with other nations and highlight both the contrasting policies pursued by Westminster as well as the threat of the UK leaving the EU as potentially resulting in dire consequences for Scotland. A successful bid for independence, the SNP argues, will result in the powers necessary for the development of the Scottish nation as well as the ability to remedy the domestic issues they face. Specifically, the ability to help the poor, both domestically as well as internationally, is mentioned as a potential ability resulting from secession.

As is the case for the SNP, PC in Wales also desire secession from the UK. However, it is clear that PC regard this as a long-term goal and have by contrast their immediate focus on acquiring a devolution of powers from the UK to as large a degree as possible. Similar to the SNP's argument of dire consequences for Scotland, if such a devolution and ultimate bid for secession does not come to fruition, PC argues that the development of Wales will face stagnation. PC continues, then, to take the justification for further devolution one step further in political terms when compared to Scotland. Whereas the SNP mentions opposing policies with Westminster, PC openly discredits the Westminster rule by referring to it as a colonial rule, a clear suggestion that Westminster government's rule over Wales lacks legitimacy. Consequently, devolution of powers is portrayed as a return to legitimate rule of their own nation which will also result in a more confident Wales, a humbler approach than the equality of nations as argued by the SNP. With regards to the component of nationalist politico-ideological arguments; Class, this constitutes a negative finding, since neither the SNP, nor PC, were found to utilise this component in their argumentation.

6.3.2 Comparison of the Nationalist Economic Arguments

In as much as was presented in the analysis of the Scottish nationalist economic arguments aiming to make a case for secession, made by the SNP in the Scottish Parliament during 2014, we can see that they were utilising tactics connected to all of the three sub-questions which stand to answer the principal research question of this study. The idea that economic dependency and exploitation is constraining the Scottish economy from prosperity is advanced to highlight both the expected benefits which stand to be harvested with

independence, as well as to point to the hazards that face the Scottish economy if Scotland were to remain within the UK. As the benefits are said to be that decisions affecting the Scottish economy, finally, could be made first and foremost in Scotland's best interest, be it with regards to international trade, stimulation of business conditions or increased activity in the Scottish labour market, the hazards are presented as damaging domestic economic policy made by the Westminster government in combination with the dire economic consequences that would face Scotland if it were to remain within the UK and Great Britain leaves the EU. With regards to the position that Scotland has within the EU, there is a perception that full agricultural funding from the EU is wrongfully being denied Scotland due to its membership of the EU as a region within the UK. What is more, the SNP argues that subsidies from the EU would wrongfully be denied Scotland completely if Britain were to leave the EU, since the SNP's position is that a Scottish membership of the EU is imperative for the Scottish economy.

By contrast, we do not see any claims made by PC that there are economic factors which rightfully should be at Wales's disposal which are being denied to them during the period of this inquiry, which perhaps can be seen as odd, given that neither the Welsh, nor the Scottish economy is argued by PC to be the object of favourable treatment from the government in Westminster, since the idiosyncrasies of both economies are suggested to be disregarded when austerity implementations awaits. But PC is, very much like the SNP, making their arguments within the context that the Welsh economy is being suppressed, which to a very large degree is expressed through acts of economic exploitation as the subordinate position is implied by PC to make both Wales and Scotland victims of reckless economic policy implementation by the UK government. Similarly, the position of economic dependency is also stressed intensively, but as the dependent position of their labour markets is recognised by both PC and the SNP, PC lifts the issue of economic dependency to the next level by explicitly stating it at an official meeting of the Welsh Assembly. It is also so, that PC, similar to the SNP, is making their arguments within contexts characterised either by a future where it would be expected that decisions regarding the Welsh economy are taken which set the interests of Wales first, or a future where the continued subjugated position within the UK will prevent the Welsh labour force to develop in line with what the Welsh economy needs.

6.3.3 Comparison of the Nationalist Socio-Cultural Arguments

The nationalist socio-cultural argumentation made by members of the SNP during the parliamentary debates in 2014 touches upon the full spectrum of this study's sub-questions.

Most prominently, however, we have seen that the SNP, in socio-cultural terms, were utilising the attraction of what can be expected in a future of Scottish independence. The prospect of being able to cultivate Scotland's national identity by controlling television broadcasting in Scotland stands out, but perhaps an even stronger nationalist sentiment is displayed as independence is suggested as the solution to closing the existing educational attainment gap, which would go a long way, not only for the cultivation of the Scottish national identity, but also for the cultivation of a standardised education system which conforms to Scottish requirements. What is interesting here, however, is that this socio-cultural issue is addressed within an economic context, because it suggests that the reasons for the SNP's secessionist standpoint stems from Scotland's economic position. The educational attainment gap also demonstrates the perils of remaining within the UK, as independence is argued to be the only way to close the educational attainment gap and end the suppression of the poorest people of the Scottish community. With regards to the idea that there is something, socio-culturally, which rightfully belongs to Scotland due to its subordinate position within the UK, the right to allow its poorest populace the prospects of social mobility is being suggested, and makes perfect theoretical sense, but is not specifically outspoken.

In contrast to the SNP, PC places an emphasis on utilising the Welsh language as a foundation towards unification of the Welsh communities as well as the required popular support necessary to achieve independence. Whilst the manners expressed by both parties on the need to cultivate their respective national identities differs, it is evident, and not surprising, that the national identity is paramount within the secessionist processes of both parties. Likewise, both parties share the notion that their cultivating processes of national identity face suppression by the Westminster government. In addition to suppression of the national identity, both countries share a perceived suppression of social mobility. Albeit the manifestation of said suppression of social mobility touches upon education in both countries, it is more distinct in statements by the SNP whilst PC's statements are predominantly centred on the perceived suppression of the Welsh language. What is clear within both political parties, is a belief that the perceived suppression and resulting consequences will persist if further devolution and independence do not come to pass. If said devolution and independence were to progress, at large, both parties suggest that the above-mentioned issues would, if not be completely solved, then in the very least provide them with the tools required to address these issues. Additionally, it is suggested by PC that further devolution, and ultimately independence, would result in unification of the previously divided Welsh communities.

7. Conclusions

The aim of this thesis was to explore how nationalist arguments are utilised by the SNP in the Scottish Parliament and PC in the Welsh Assembly when making their claims for secession. Through the application of modernist-nationalist theories on the statements made by the SNP and PC, we set out to answer how the arguments would manifest within the three nationalist sub-categories; the politico-ideological, the economic and the socio-cultural. In addition, three sub-questions were applied to reveal how the nationalist arguments found would align themselves towards secession. The first sub-question, “What, that is rightfully ours is being denied to us?” revealed answers that served the purpose to depict how the case for secession was justified. The second sub-question “What will happen if we do not secede?” showed arguments aiming to portray threats that would come to pass if secession is not attained, and in an opposing fashion “What do we expect out of secession?” divulged attempts to illustrate a prosperous future that would come to pass when secession is achieved.

The SNP and PC commonly share the goal of secession but find themselves in very different stages of that process. The fundamental difference between the two is that Scotland, in 2014, had a referendum on independence from the UK, and as such the SNP primarily argued for independence whilst PC were arguing for further devolution of powers.

The justification for secession utilised by the SNP is primarily based on a notion of necessity rather than questions of legitimacy. The necessity in turn, is centred around the premise that the policies pursued by the UK government are at odds with the interests of Scotland, the core of which is manifested in economic arguments and the perception of Scotland being suppressed by an economic dependency that is prone to get worse. The SNP’s arguments for secession are characterized by the notion that independence will solve both the economic dependency as well as allow Scotland to cultivate its national identity whilst assuming a position of equal diplomatic partnership with the rest of the countries in the western hemisphere.

The arguments aimed to justify secession by PC are primarily defined by attempts to foster a distinct separation between Wales and the UK government, an example of which is the referencing of the UK government as a colonial rule. More prominently, a large importance is placed on the development of the Welsh culture, and specifically the Welsh language, which PC holds as a necessity for the cultivation of the Welsh national identity. The development of the Welsh language plays such a significant role in alienating Wales from the UK that it

seems, ultimately, to be the very foundation on which the building of the possibility for secession is to stand to become a reality. Just like the SNP in Scotland, PC in Wales portray the relationship with the UK government as an economic dependency where development and cultivation of national identity are suppressed. Consistently made evident throughout the nationalist arguments made by PC, is the notion that the primary solution to the issues they face is a continuing devolution of powers that will eventually lead to secession.

In terms of how the findings of this study have implications for the previous academic work that has been conducted within the fields of nationalism and secessionism, we would argue that the findings made here confirm a number of the claims and ideas laid down by political researchers before us. Perhaps most notable is Miller's "principle of nationality" as a claim for secession (1997) which suits rather well the cases presented by the SNP and PC respectively, along with Haesley's suggestions for the centralities of Scottish and Welsh national identities (2005), which again can be traced in the arguments of both parties.

Through the utilisation of Gellner, Hechter and Breuilly, all prominent scholars within the field of modernist nationalism, the application and subsequent theories from which the analytical framework was derived has allowed us to gain a more structured understanding of the most prominent features of nationalist arguments applied by the SNP and PC. Specifically, we were able to learn not only which forms were used as the arguments corresponded to the analytical framework, but also how the arguments differentiated between Scotland and Wales due to the proximity of the Scottish referendum on independence.

Whilst this study is not sufficient on its own in order to construct a complete picture of the nationalist character of the SNP and PC, it certainly serves as an incentive for such a comprehensive study to be conducted. More specifically, a more extensive study, with regards to the time and space allowed, asking questions relating to the underlying reasons for the differences in the secessionist approaches by the SNP and PC, could certainly generate interesting findings and hopefully raise meaningful questions. Another example would be questions on the effects of the argumentation by the SNP and PC, come the day when, and if, Brexit becomes a reality, and with such an approach it could certainly be interesting to include the effects which that might have on the nationalist discourses and the desire for secession in Northern Ireland.

On a broader, and a more general note, it is our conviction that the work conducted in this project has engendered findings which set political parties with a nationalist foundation and a

secessionist agenda in a relatively contemporary context. As nationalism appears to continue to be influential in both the national and international political arenas within the foreseeable future, we believe that this study may fertilise the interest for analysing nationalist discourses, not only within different levels of political assemblies, but also for nationalist discourses in general. We do recognize, however, that the model utilised here might need some fine tuning in order to properly suit the specific idiosyncrasies which serve as the prerequisites for the emergence of nationalism in different settings and *milieus*.

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